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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TRUSTING THE TRIBE: UNDERSTANDING THE TENSIONS OF
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
“. . . Remember your birth, how your mother struggled
to give you form and breath. You are evidence of
her life, and her mother’s, and hers.
Remember your father. He is your life, also . . .
Remember you are all people and all people are you.
Remember you are this universe and this universe is you.
Remember all is in motion, is growing, is you.
Remember language comes from this.
Remember the dance language is, that life is.
Remember.” 1
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (“ICWA”) was enacted to address
abusive child welfare practices which resulted in the separation of Indian
children from their families and tribes. 2 Testimony from Senate hearings directly
preceding the enactment of the ICWA estimated that twenty-five to thirty-five
percent of all Indian children were separated from their families and placed in
adoptive families, foster care, or institutions. 3 This widespread removal of
Indian children caused serious adjustment problems for children and had
negative impacts on tribal communities. 4
The ICWA has been the subject of controversy and criticism since its
enactment, with emotionally-charged challenges to its constitutionality
occurring before the Supreme Court in 1989 in Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, and in 2013 in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl. On August 9,
2019, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on a controversial challenge to
the ICWA: Brackeen, et. al., v. Bernhardt, et. al., a case in which the United

1. Joy Harjo, “Remember,” Strawberry Press (1981).
2. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989).
3. Id.
4. Id. See also Twila L. Perry, infra note 89, at 88 (noting that while most of the social science
research on transracial adoption has concluded that Black children who are adopted by White
families can grow up to be emotionally healthy, happy, and productive citizens, researchers have
more openly acknowledged and discussed some of the serious complications and problems that can
arise in transracial adoptions); BARBARA ANN ATWOOD, CHILDREN, TRIBES, AND STATES:
ADOPTION AND CUSTODY CONFLICTS OVER AMERICAN INDIAN CHILDREN 50–51 (2010)
(describing the difficulties transracial adoptees face in connecting to their sense of Indian identity
and community).
241

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

242

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:241

States District Court for the Northern District of Texas found the ICWA
unconstitutional on multiple grounds. 5 This Note analyzes the Fifth Circuit’s
reversal of the district court’s findings in Bernhardt by focusing on the tensions
within the ICWA between tribes, biological parents, adoptive parents, state court
systems, tribal courts, and Indian children. After addressing the court’s findings,
this Note offers four modifications to the ICWA, each aimed at recognizing the
value of the tribe and promoting the best interests of Indian children.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
The reasons for removing Indian children from their families prior to the
enactment of the ICWA were structural—meaning aimed at a policy of
terminating the role of Indians in American society and territory—and
individual—meaning based on misunderstanding and cultural insensitivity
toward Indian child-rearing and community practices. Beginning in the early
1800s, missionary schools and federally-operated boarding schools removed
Native American children from their tribes and families and placed them at
boarding schools far away from reservations. 6 Boarding schools for Native
American children inculcated Christian values and prohibited Native language,
attire, and hairstyles; striving to “civilize” Native American children by
changing their dress, language, religious practices, and outlook on life. 7 The
boarding school experience separated children from their homes for long periods
of time and subsequently broke their ties with their families and tribes. 8
Child welfare policy became increasingly interventionist in the twentieth
century, and public and private agencies focused on individual child-rearing
practices. 9 State child welfare officials rejected traditional Indian approaches to
child rearing, including the common practice of involving members of a child’s

5. See Gabby Deutch, A Court Battle over a Dallas Toddler Could Decide the Future of
Native American Law, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 21, 2019), available at https://www.theatlantic.com/
family/archive/2019/02/indian-child-welfare-acts-uncertain-future/582628/ [https://perma.cc/SV5
B-BGGZ]; see also Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (2019).
6. ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 29–30, 155–56.
7. Id. at 30, 156.
8. Id. at 156. See MARGARET D. JACOBS, A GENERATION REMOVED 69–71 (2014) for a
narrative discussing the impact of removal on Indian children as well as prevailing race, class, and
gender discrimination, which led to the removal of children from their tribes and families. Congress
further acknowledges the devastation caused by boarding schools, noting that it considers it in the
best interests of Indian children to be afforded the opportunity to live at home while attending
school, and that more than 10,000 Navajo children “have been boarded.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386
at 7549–50.
9. ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 157. The legislative history of the ICWA reveals that financial
considerations of agencies contributed to the policy of removing Indian children from their homes.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386 at 7533. Congress concluded, “agencies established to place children have
an incentive to find children to place.” Id.
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extended family in significant care giving roles. 10 Thus, state officials often
construed the practice of grandparents and extended family members caring for
children as neglect, abandonment, and grounds for terminating parental rights. 11
Officials relied on high rates of alcoholism and poverty within reservation
communities as further justifications for removing Indian children from their
families. 12 Overall, these practices led to the removal of between twenty-five
and thirty-five percent of all Indian children from their families by 1974. 13 In
evaluating this grim history of cultural genocide, Congress concluded that “[t]he
wholesale separation of Indian children from their families is perhaps the most
tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life today.” 14
The ICWA acknowledges the tragic history of the removal of Indian
children and announces that “there is no resource that is more vital to the
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children . . . .” 15 In
the ICWA, Congress recognized that administrative and judicial bodies have
often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the
cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families. 16 In
enacting the ICWA, Congress expressly found that the state court systems and
state agencies have often acted contrary to the interests of Indian tribes and their
10. ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 160; H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386 at 7532 (1978).
11. Id. State practices leading to the often-unfounded removal of Indian children “stemmed
regularly from cultural ignorance or even blatant racism about Indian families and their childrearing capacities” and ignored the value and role of extensive tribal kinship systems. N. BRUCE
DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 150 (2008); see also Brian D. Gallagher, Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978: The Congressional Foray Into the Adoption Process, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
81, 82 (1994) (pointing out the failure of non-Indian judges in child welfare cases to recognize the
differences between Indian culture and that of mainstream America, as well as non-Indian judges’
propensity to accept imprecise definitions of “abuse” and “neglect,” which resulted in the removal
of Indian children from their homes).
12. ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 160. While one of the grounds most frequently advanced for
taking Indian children from their parents was the abuse of alcohol, this standard was applied
unequally. For example, in areas where rates of “problem drinking” among Indians and non-Indians
were the same, it was rarely applied against non-Indians. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386 at 7533 (1978).
13. ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 159; see also DUTHU, supra note 11, at 17 (noting that in states
like South Dakota, Indian children were placed in foster care at a rate sixteen times that of nonIndian children; Washington’s adoption rate for Indian children was nineteen times that of nonIndian children just prior to the enactment of the ICWA).
14. ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 159 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386); see also Donna J.
Goldsmith, Individual vs. Collective Rights: The Indian Child Welfare Act, 13 HARVARD WOMEN’S
L. J. 1 (1990) (calling the ICWA an effort “to halt what had become a genocidal phenomenon” of
removing Indian children from their homes and communities).
15. Id. at 36; 25 U.S.C. §1901 (1978). See also Stan Watts, Voluntary Adoptions Under the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Balancing the Interests of Children, Families, and Tribes, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 213, 214 (1989) (noting that the removal of Indian children from their families and
tribes to non-Indian foster and adoptive homes “threatens to deprive tribes of the most basic
necessity for their survival – a next generation.”).
16. 25 U.S.C. §1901 (1978).
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children and thus, Congress gave Indian tribes a right of action in Federal court
with respect to child custody issues. 17 Congress expressed concern that court
actions resulting in the removal of Indian children from their homes may be
conducted in the absence of due process, and thus determined that if judges were
more knowledgeable about Indian culture and required to find more precise
information and evidence of abuse and neglect, they could largely nullify
abusive or improper actions of social workers. 18 Therefore, the ICWA protects
the rights of the Indian child as an Indian, and the rights of the Indian community
and tribe in retaining its children in its society. 19 The ICWA protects Indian
children and tribes by making sure that Indian child welfare determinations are
not based on “a white, middle-class standard which, in many cases, forecloses
placement with an Indian family.” 20
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
The ICWA uses a combination of jurisdictional and procedural rules, in
addition to substantive placement criteria, to restore tribal authority in child
placement decisions and to guide placement decisions when they occur in state
court. 21 The congressional findings at the beginning of the ICWA set the stage
for the regulations and establish congressional authority to protect the most vital
resource of Indian tribes: their children.
The enactment of the ICWA is predicated on Congress’ interpretation of the
Indian Commerce Clause and recognition of a federal responsibility to Indians
individually and as tribes. 22 Thus, the ICWA expressly recognizes that Congress
has plenary power over Indian affairs and has therefore assumed responsibility
for protecting and preserving tribes and their resources. 23 Further, the ICWA
was enacted because “there is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children,” and “the United
17. Id.; see Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 553 (1991)
(interpreting the ICWA as “intend[ing] to give Indian tribes access to federal court to determine
their rights and obligations under” the ICWA); see also Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1045-46 (9th
Cir. 2005) (affirming Congress’ reasoning that without a cause of action under the ICWA, tribes
would essentially be left without a remedy where state courts act contrary to the interests of Indian
tribes).
18. Ester C. Kim, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield: Contemplation of All,
the Best Interests of None, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 766 (1991).
19. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37.
20. Id. (quoting U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, at 7546); but see Kim, supra note 18
(noting that critics of the ICWA express concern that the ICWA does little to address the cultural
biases of state courts, agencies, and social workers and instead simply eliminates the state from the
proceedings by transferring jurisdiction to the tribal courts).
21. DUTHU, supra note 11, at 17.
22. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 7537 (1978) (recognizing a
responsibility of the United States to protect the integrity of the tribes).
23. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978).
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States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are
members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” 24 In the ICWA,
Congress acknowledged that state judicial bodies and administrative agencies
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and
the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and
families. 25
Under the ICWA, an Indian child is “any unmarried minor who is either a
member of a federally-recognized Indian tribe or who is eligible for membership
and is the biological child of a member of a tribe.” 26 The burden of proof rests
with the party claiming that the child is an Indian child.27 The mere assertion
that a child has some Indian blood is not sufficient; rather, where the court is
uncertain as to whether a child is an Indian child under the ICWA, the court
should contact the tribes for which the child may be eligible for membership and
accept the tribe’s determination as to that child’s membership as conclusive. 28
Consistent with the purpose of protecting the tribe’s role in deciding child
custody issues among Indian families, the Bureau of Indian Affairs’s (“BIA”)
2016 Final Rule also provides that a tribe’s determination of a child’s
membership is conclusive. 29 Whether Indian status is viewed as a racial
classification, a cultural identity, or political membership in a sovereign entity,
with the incidence of intermarriage between non-Indians and Indians at its
highest point in history, tensions abound between non-Indian and Indian parents
and the multiple identities a child may possess.30
24. Id. Accurate implementation of the ICWA requires review of a precise list of definitions
codified in 25 U.S.C. § 1901, including definitions of “tribe,” “parent,” “child custody proceeding,”
and other terms. See generally Gallagher, supra note 11.
25. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978).
26. Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New
Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 608 (2002). The ICWA does not
apply to children who are placed with one parent in a divorce. GARY A. SOKOLOW, NATIVE
AMERICANS AND THE LAW, A DICTIONARY 107–08 (2000).
27. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 295 (4th ed. 2012).
28. Id. at 294.
29. Id.
30. Atwood, supra note 26, at 610; GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ACT, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 18–19 (2016); see also 25 C.F.R. § 23.109 (2018),
explaining that if the Indian child meets the definition of “Indian child” through more than one
tribe, deference should be given to the tribe in which the Indian child is already a member, unless
otherwise agreed to by the tribes. Further, if the Indian child meets the definition of “Indian child”
by being a member of more than one tribe, then the tribes decide which shall be designated as the
tribe for the purposes of the custody proceedings. Finally, if a child is eligible for membership in
more than one tribe, but is a member of none, the tribes decide which shall be designed as the
child’s tribe for the purposes of the child custody proceeding. Where the tribes cannot decide, the
court may designate the tribe. All potential tribes of which the child may be a member must be
notified for the purposes of a child custody proceeding under the ICWA, and it is best practice to
hold a hearing to determine the child’s tribe.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

246

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:241

III. JURISDICTION: DETERMINING THE ROLE OF THE TRIBE
With the purpose of protecting the tribe’s role in child custody proceedings,
the exclusive power of the tribe trumps individual choice. 31 In order to serve this
purpose, the ICWA creates a system of dual jurisdiction between state court
systems and tribal court systems, while establishing a strong preference for tribal
courts to oversee child custody proceedings. 32 The ICWA as a whole
“emphasizes the tribe’s competency to make adoption decisions with respect to
tribal children.” 33 However, because tribal courts may be better-suited and more
willing to make complex evaluations about child custody, which include
considering the interests of the child, the birth parents, the adoptive parents, and
the tribe, the answer to the question of who has jurisdiction over the proceedings
may determine whether the ICWA’s purpose is accomplished. 34
The ICWA curbs state court authority to decide foster and adoptive matters
involving Indian children by providing for exclusive tribal court jurisdiction
over any child welfare proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is
domiciled on a reservation, or is a ward of tribal court. 35 In the instance of a
child domiciled on a reservation, the tribe’s authority is paramount and cannot
be defeated or circumvented, even by a biological parent who wants to place
their child for adoption through the state courts instead. 36 Underneath the
question of whether a custody proceeding belongs in state or tribal court is the
possible tension between an Indian parent’s desire to place their child outside of
the tribal community in a non-Indian home, and the tribe’s ability to preempt
that choice in the tribal court context. 37 Because tribal rights and interests are
placed above the interests and rights of the individual in custody proceedings
involving a child domiciled on a reservation, resentment toward the tribe may
be created which in turn, “may lead to migration of the young from the tribes,
the very result the [ICWA] is attempting to prevent.” 38 While scholars point out
the possible equal protections issue in this tension, in Fisher v. District Court,
the Supreme Court resolved it by finding that even where a jurisdictional
31. Atwood, supra note 26, at 611; see also Goldsmith, infra note 37, at 7 (acknowledging the
tension between jurisprudence recognizing that the “right to raise one’s children is considered an
essential and basic civil right,” and the Indian tradition of perceiving oneself as part of a larger
cultural group, not as a completely autonomous individual).
32. PEVAR, supra note 27, at 293.
33. Kasey D. Ogle, Why Try to Change Me Now – The Basis for the 2016 Indian Child Welfare
Act Regulations, 96 NEB. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2018).
34. See Watts, supra note 15, at 231–32.
35. Atwood, supra note 26, at 611.
36. Id. See also Watts, supra note 15, at 245 (pointing out that “[w]hether the parent is
motivated by a desire to give the child a ‘better life’ off the reservation or merely to find the highest
bidder for an unwanted child, the parent is not permitted a choice of forums”).
37. Donna J. Goldsmith, Individual vs. Collective Rights: the Indian Child Welfare Act, 13
HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 1, 2 (1990).
38. Kim, supra note 18, at 792.
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decision occasionally denies an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian
has access, that disparate treatment is justified because it is intended to benefit
Indians by furthering the congressional policy of self-government. 39
Even where a child is domiciled off a reservation, the presumption is that
the tribal courts, not the state courts, should have jurisdiction to decide the child
custody issue. 40 When a state court has reason to believe that a child may come
under the ICWA, it has a duty to properly notify the tribe concerned. 41 The
child’s tribe, Indian parent, or Indian custodian may petition the state court to
transfer the case to the tribal court and the state court must transfer the case
unless either parent objects to the transfer, the tribe declines to accept the
transfer, or there is “good cause” for the state court to refuse. 42
Examples of “good cause” include a lack of a tribal judicial tribunal; a lack
of contact between the child and the tribe; a situation where the child is more
than twelve years old and does not want the case heard in tribal court; and
evidence that it would be extremely difficult or cause great hardship to present
the evidence necessary to decide the case in tribal court. 43 The 2016 Final Rule
offers examples of good cause 44 for the state tribunal to refuse to transfer the
custody proceedings to tribal courts. However, the guidelines caution that the
socioeconomic conditions of the tribe or the perceived inadequacy of tribal
social services or court systems may not be considered in determining whether

39. Watts, supra note 15, at 245 (quoting Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390–91
(1976)).
40. SOKOLOW, supra note 26, at 108.
41. Id.; 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1978).
42. SOKOLOW, supra note 26, at 108; see 25 U.S.C. §1911(b) (1978). See also Carriere, infra
note 315, at 649–50 (arguing that although it has been suggested that Congress should define
additional circumstances in which the state court would retain jurisdiction over child welfare
proceedings, relying on the tribe to decline jurisdiction is the solution most consistent with the
Act’s purpose of entrusting decisions on the welfare of Indian children, even those with multiple
or mixed identities, to the tribe).
43. SOKOLOW, supra note 26, at 108–09.
44. The legislative history of this provision indicates that this provision is intended to permit
a state court to apply a modified doctrine of forum non conveniens, in appropriate cases, to insure
that the rights of the child, the Indian parents or custodian, and the tribe are fully protected.
Exceptions cannot be construed in a manner that would swallow the rule. GUIDELINES FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 48–49 (2016);
see also 25 C.F.R. § 23.118(c) (“In determining whether good cause exists, the court must not
consider: (1) Whether the foster-care or termination-of-parental-rights proceeding is at an advanced
stage if the Indian child’s parent, Indian custodian, or Tribe did not receive notice of the childcustody proceeding until an advanced stage; (2) Whether there have been prior proceedings
involving the child for which no petition to transfer was filed; (3) Whether transfer could affect the
placement of the child; (4) The Indian child’s cultural connections with the Tribe or its reservation;
or (5) Socioeconomic conditions or any negative perception of Tribal or BIA social services or
judicial systems.”).
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good cause exists. 45 There is an open question regarding whether state courts
may use this “good cause” provision to consider the best interests of the child,
and state courts are divided on this issue. 46 For example, some courts, as in the
Matter of Adoption of T.R.M., use the best interests of the child as a measure of
good cause to deny a transfer to tribal court. 47 In weighing whether there was
good cause to deny a transfer to tribal court, the court determined that since the
biological mother’s “parenting record was not good,” and she had “a long history
of drug and alcohol abuse,” the custody of the child by the biological mother
would likely result in serious emotional and physical harm to the child.48
Further, the court pointed out that the child had resided with her adoptive family
since the first week of her life, and “[t]o now sever and dislodge the child from
the family and culture she has known during all of her seven years of life cannot
be anything except devastating to the best interests of the child.” 49 The court
stated that while the purpose of the ICWA to protect the interests of the Indian
family was patently clear, “a paramount interest is the protection of the best
interests of the child.” 50
On the other hand, some state courts use “little or no contact with the tribe”
as a proxy for determining whether the ICWA applies to the custody
proceedings, even if the child is an Indian child for the purposes of the Act. For
example, in Matter of Adoption of T.R.M., the court reasoned that since “[t]he
purpose of the Act is to promote the best interest[s] of Indian children through
promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families. . . [t]he Act is
applicable when you have Indian children being removed from their existing
Indian environment.” 51 The court acknowledged the biological ancestry of the
child as Indian, however the court weighed the fact that she was “abandoned to
the adoptive mother essentially at the earliest practical moment after childbirth
and initial hospital care,” as meaning that the child’s subsequent adoption did
45. Atwood, supra note 26, at 613. The regulations prohibit consideration of perceived
socioeconomic conditions within a tribe because Congress found that misplaced concerns about
low incomes, substandard housing, and similar factors on reservations resulted in the unwarranted
removal of Indian children from their families and tribes, introduced bias into the decision-making
process, and thus should not come into play in considering whether transfer is appropriate.
GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
49, 51 (2016).
46. Atwood, supra note 26, at 613.
47. See Matter of Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 308 (1988). See also Wisconsin
Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719, 727 (W.D. Mich.
1973) (finding that while the ultimate question of the best interests of the children was not directly
before the court, it does not necessarily follow that the court is thereby precluded from any
consideration of the question).
48. Matter of Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d at 308.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 303.
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not constitute a “breakup of the Indian family.” 52 Thus, the court declined to
transfer the proceedings to tribal court and found that the ICWA did not apply.53
When an Indian child is domiciled off the reservation and placed for
voluntary adoption in a state court proceeding, the parents’ interests as
individuals, where those interests may diverge from the tribe in the child custody
proceedings, may play a more dominant and vocal role in the custody
proceedings. 54 Some scholars argue this illustrates Congress’ intent to protect
parental autonomy. 55 Section 1911 of the ICWA provides for concurrent state
and tribal court jurisdiction in child placement proceedings where a child is
domiciled off the reservation, and this concurrent jurisdiction “implicitly
recognizes the right of Indian parents to separate themselves from tribal
influence by choosing to assimilate into non-Indian society and to exercise their
parental prerogatives with minimal interference from outside groups.” 56 Parental
authority can be exercised in the form of an objection to a transfer to tribal court,
as well as the state court’s consideration of a parent’s placement preferences for
the child, 57 thus providing a counterbalance to the tribal authority recognized
throughout the ICWA. 58 These opportunities permit individualized justice where
a parent’s wishes diverge from the interests of their tribe. 59
Even where a tribe declines to intervene or refuses a transfer to a tribal court,
the ICWA still governs the child custody proceedings in state court for Indian
children, thereby preserving the tribe’s role in making adoption decisions with
respect to Indian children. 60 The ICWA allows tribes to intervene as parties in
state court proceedings, reflecting the rationale that “state courts are more likely
to make proper placement decisions if tribes have an opportunity to inform the
court as to the tribe’s social and cultural values” and participate in the custody
determination process. 61

52. Id. The Indian child, T.R.M., was placed for adoption at five days old after her mother
made arrangements prior to her birth, and T.R.M. lived with her adoptive family for seven years
before the custody proceedings were brought in this case. Id. at 301–02.
53. Id. at 303.
54. Atwood, supra note 26, at 612.
55. Atwood, supra note 26, at 612; but see Adoption of Lindsay C., 229 Cal. App. 3d 404,
412 (1991) (finding that pursuant to the Court’s holding in Holyfield, congressional objectives make
clear that a rule of domicile which would permit individual Indian parents to defeat the ICWA’s
jurisdictional scheme is inconsistent with what Congress intended).
56. See Watts, supra note 15, at 230–31.
57. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (state court must consider parent’s preference in determining
placements of Indian children “where appropriate”)
58. ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 192–193.
59. See id.
60. SOKOLOW, supra note 26, at 109.
61. PEVAR, supra note 27, at 293-294.
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IV. PLACEMENT PREFERENCES
The ICWA establishes “minimum Federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster
or adoptive homes.” 62 Congress created a framework to govern the adoption of
Indian children, establishing: “(1) placement preferences in adoptions of Indian
children; (2) good cause to depart from those placement preferences; (3)
standards and responsibilities for state courts and their agents; and (4)
consequences flowing from noncompliance with the statutory requirements.” 63
“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference
shall be given, in absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1)
a member of the child’s extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s
tribe; or (3) other Indian families.” 64 In contrast to the placement categories for
adoption, the ICWA provides a more nuanced description of the tribe’s role in
foster care and pre-adoptive placement, finding that the child must be placed “in
the least restrictive setting which most approximates a family and in which his
special needs, if any, may be met.” 65 Further, the child shall also be placed
within reasonable proximity to his or her home, with a preference given, in the
absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with a member of the
Indian child’s extended family, a foster home or institution approved by the
tribe, or an Indian foster home licensed or approved by a non-Indian licensing
authority. 66 The ICWA requires that the standards applied in the preference
requirements be the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian
community in which the parent or extended family resides or maintains social
and cultural ties to. 67
V. THE EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY DOCTRINE
Section 1912(f) of the ICWA addresses the termination of parental rights
with respect to an Indian child, providing that no termination of parental rights
may be ordered in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or
Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to
the child. 68 Section 1912(d) of the ICWA provides that any party seeking to
place an Indian child in foster care or terminate parental rights to an Indian child
under state law “shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to
62. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 521 (N.D. Tex. 2018); 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1978).
63. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 521.
64. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1978).
65. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1978).
66. Id.
67. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1978).
68. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2252, 2560 (2013) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)
(1978)).
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provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the
breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.” 69
Further, an Indian child may not be placed in foster care absent a determination,
supported by clear and convincing evidence, that the continued custody of the
child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to
the child. 70
The language of Section 1912(d) gives rise to an entirely judge-made,
controversial body of law known as the “existing Indian family” doctrine. 71
Applied by some state courts, the existing Indian family doctrine mirrors the
concept of “good cause” discussed above, and finds that the ICWA does not
apply where the child involved has no demonstrable social and cultural links to
an existing Indian family. 72 Under this controversial doctrine, state courts
employ a “minimum contacts” analysis to determine whether the child’s ties to
its Indian parent and tribe are sufficient to trigger application of the ICWA. 73
The existing Indian family doctrine finds that the ICWA is applicable only where
an Indian child is removed from an existing Indian family, home, or culture,
regardless of how the child would be classified under the Act. 74 This doctrine
can be summarized as an argument that while the protection of genuine Indian
families is compelling, it is not compelling enough to interfere with the adoptive
placement of a child who was never part of an existing Indian family. 75 This
doctrine is sometimes used by state courts as a proxy to determine if a child is
an Indian under the ICWA, and therefore, whether the tribal courts have
jurisdiction over the proceeding or the right to intervene in a custody proceeding
in state court. 76 Where the court determines that no Indian family exists, the tribe

69. Id. at 2562 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1978)). Legislative history reveals Congress’
acknowledgement that many states already required remedial and rehabilitative services, however
these services were rarely provided and thus, Congress enacted a Federal requirement of these
services being provided to Indian children and their families. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386 at 22 (1978).
70. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (1978).
71. DUTHU, supra note 11, at 153; see also ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 204.
72. DUTHU, supra note 11, at 153.
73. Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision of the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 419, 430 (1998).
74. Gallagher, supra note 11, at 96. See also Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Children of the Tribe:
Determining Children’s Identity under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
POL’Y 19, 20 (1996) (pointing out that courts have reasoned that this judicial doctrine is consistent
with the ICWA’s policy of promoting the stability and survival of Indian tribes and culture through
federal standards intended to promote the unwarranted removal of Indian children, and when a
child’s family is not actually affiliated with a tribe or tribal culture, the voluntary placement of the
child with non-Indian adopters is not a removal, and certainly not an unwarranted removal, under
the ICWA).
75. See Hollinger, supra note 74, at 21.
76. Christine Metteer, supra note 73, at 430. See also Matter of Adoption of T.R.M., 525
N.E.2d at 308.
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is “effectively remov[ed] . . . from the equation.” 77 Some state courts have
extended this doctrine to include an analysis of whether the child “would
probably [ever] become a part of . . . any . . . Indian family.” 78
Critics of this doctrine argue that state courts often seek to circumvent the
application of the ICWA since much of the litigation around the ICWA centers
on attempts to avoid employing the strict standards of the Act by finding that
there is no existing Indian family. 79 A common set of facts giving rise to the
application of the existing Indian family doctrine involves an Indian parent who
has relinquished custody or who no longer has contact with the child, and a nonIndian parent who has custody of the child and is seeking to place them for
adoption with a non-Indian family. 80 For example, in Adoption of Baby Boy L,
the Kansas Supreme Court held that the ICWA did not apply to adoption
proceedings involving an illegitimate child born to an Indian father and a nonIndian mother, because the child had never been in the care or custody of the
Indian father. 81 Relying on the plain meaning of the ICWA, the court determined
that the issue of the preservation of an Indian family was not involved in the case
because the child had never been a part of any Indian family. 82 The court
reasoned that Congress was not trying to use the ICWA to dictate that an
illegitimate infant who has never been a member of an Indian home or culture,
and probably never would be, should be removed from its adoptive family and
placed in an Indian environment over the express objections of its non-Indian
mother. 83
While proponents of this exception argue that the language of the ICWA is
broad enough to be interpreted to require an existing Indian family, opponents
argue that this interpretation is contrary to the plain language and purpose of the
ICWA. 84 Courts have found that the application of this judicially-created
existing Indian family doctrine reflects the ongoing issue that “the States . . .
have often failed to recognize essential tribal relations of Indian people, and the

77. See Gallagher, supra note 11, at 97.
78. Metteer, supra note 73, at 431.
79. See Gallagher, supra note 11, at 96. See also ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 208 (explaining
instances where state courts have used the “existing Indian family” exception to “escape the
application of the Act.”).
80. See generally Matter of Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d at 304–05 (discussing contact
with the tribe as a proxy for deciding whether a child is an Indian child for the purposes of a custody
proceeding and ultimately, whether the tribe will have a role in the proceedings); see also ATWOOD,
supra note 4, at 207 (noting that in many cases applying the “existing Indian family” doctrine, the
children who were the subject of the proceedings had an Indian and non-Indian parent and the
dispute arose where a parent chose to place the child with a non-Indian family).
81. 643 P.2d 168, 176 (Kan. 1982).
82. Id. at 168.
83. Id. at 175.
84. See Gallagher, supra note 11, at 96–97.
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cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.” 85
Thus, the states that reject the application of the existing Indian family doctrine
do so because they view the ICWA’s underlying assumption to be that it is in
the Indian child’s best interest that its relationship with the tribe be protected. 86
On the other hand, some scholars suggest that instead of using the existing Indian
family doctrine, the ICWA could be improved with a more uniform procedure
for assessing a child’s Indian status, including the tribe’s determination of
membership as well as additional evidence that a child’s family perceives itself
and is perceived by others as Indian, thus permitting the parents to sever their
relationship to the tribe through their own actions and behavior. 87 The existing
Indian family doctrine plays a role in the Court’s analysis in Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, despite having arguably no presence in the ICWA and being
expressly invalidated by the Supreme Court in Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield. 88
VI. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TRIBE
The longstanding common law principle applied in child placement
decisions is the “best interests of the child” rule, which employs a multi-factor
balancing test. 89 In the context of voluntary adoption of Indian children under
the ICWA, courts should consider and balance parental preference, the nature of
the tribal and extended family relationships, the potential psychological effects
of adoption, and the potential negative impact on long-term tribal survival. 90
Some scholars also advocate for considering the child’s right to determine his or
her own identity. 91 In considering extended family relationships, scholars
advocate for a comprehensive view of family, including recognizing the
“concept of the extended family maintains its vitality and strength in the Indian
community . . . Indian child[ren] may have over a hundred ‘relatives who are

85. Metteer, supra note 73, at 435 (quoting 25. U.S.C § 1901(5) (1978)).
86. Metteer, supra note 73, at 435 (internal quotations omitted). See also Matter of Adoption
of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489–90 (S.D. 1990) (noting that the ICWA must be read to protect the
rights of the tribe even against the clearly expressed wishes of the parents). Further, the ICWA’s
application to a case is contingent only upon whether an Indian child is the subject of a child custody
proceeding—there is no other prerequisite. Id. at 490.
87. See Hollinger, supra note 74, at 21.
88. Metteer, supra note 73, at 433.
89. Twila L. Perry, Race, Color, and the Adoption of Biracial Children, 17 J. OF GENDER,
RACE & JUST., 73, 83 (2014). See also Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American:
Culture, Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 615 (1994) (calling
the best interests of the child “the shibboleth of Euro-American family law when custody is at
issue” and noting that the term “best interests” is so embedded in Euro-American values that it
would be difficult to escape attendant cultural and social biases).
90. See Watts, supra note 15, at 248.
91. See ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 46.
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counted as close, responsible members of the family.’” 92 Consideration of the
tribal and communal child-rearing culture by a state court as a factor in
determining the best interests of the child would constitute a shift in the nonIndian legal system, which acknowledges that the rights of communities are
generally secondary to the rights of individuals in contemporary American
society. 93 In considering the psychological effects of adoption, some scholars
advocate for courts to consider the risk of cultural isolation and the development
of identity issues faced by children adopted by parents of a different racial or
ethnic background. 94 Additionally, state courts and tribal courts may pursue
“creative” options for child disputes involving voluntary adoption of Indian
children by non-Indian parents, such as providing open visitation rights for
extended members of the biological family and an expectation that the child
would be exposed to the cultural values of the tribe. 95
In enacting the ICWA, “Congress determined that depriving a child of his
or her Indian heritage was not routinely in a child’s best interest.” 96 On the other
hand, critics of the majority’s decision in Holyfield, which found that the tribe
had exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings involving Indian children
domiciled on reservations, point out that the conditions on Indian reservations
are “not the type of environment to which Indian children should be mandatorily
relegated under the guise of their ‘best interest.’” 97 Some scholars suggest that
instead of merely applying a “best interests” test, courts should instead base their
custody decisions on an “avoidance of detriment test,” which would give regard
to the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time of the child’s initial
placement with a non-Indian family at the request of their parents, while also
considering the harms children are likely to suffer when they are removed from
a stable or long-term custodial environment. 98 This goal of avoiding detriment
to the child is based on the idea that children have substantive due process rights
to remain with the adoptive families their birth parents voluntarily selected. 99
The ICWA is premised upon the belief that it is in the best interest of an
Indian child to protect the role of the tribal community in the child’s life. 100
Thus, the dual purposes promoted by the ICWA, “the best interests of Indian
92. Watts, supra note 15 at 249 (quoting the H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386 at 20, 10 (1978)).
93. Id. at 250.
94. See id. at 250–51; but see Perry, supra note 89, at 91.
95. See Watts, supra note 15, at 253–54.
96. Gallagher, supra note 11, at 86.
97. See Kim supra note 18, at 793 (discussing the conditions on Pine Ridge Indian Reservation
in South Dakota where, according to a news report, fifty percent of residents have experienced
some sort of abuse, thirty-five percent drop out of school, and seventy-six percent abuse alcohol).
98. See Hollinger, supra note 74, at 22.
99. See id. at 21.
100. See Goldsmith, supra note 37, at 4. See also Watts, supra note 15, at 231 (stating that “the
best interest of an Indian child is often intertwined with tribal and family interests and that both
state and tribal courts should weigh all of these interests when making a placement decision”).
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children” and the “stability and security of Indian tribes and families,” are
intertwined. 101 Indian tribes have an interest in preventing removal of children
from their communities because both the child’s right to its own identity and the
tribal community’s need to perpetuate its culture depend on the child remaining
in the community. 102 “From the tribes’ perspective, their survival depends on
being able to reach out to current and future generations of children of partial
Indian descent whose initial tribal ties may be nonexistent or quite
attenuated.” 103 Further, “Indians perceive themselves as part of the larger
cultural group, not as completely autonomous individuals” and as such, “[e]very
child belongs to both its ‘nuclear’ family and to the tribe.” 104 Therefore, some
scholars argue that the concept that a parent has a right to remove her child from
its extended family and community and place them with a non-Indian family for
adoption or foster care, thereby depriving the child of its heritage and the
community of which it is a valued member, is a foreign concept to Indian
culture. 105
VII. WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT AND COLLATERAL ATTACK
If the custody proceeding is a termination of parental rights, “the state must
show that the parents signed a written consent before a judge and that the judge
explained the consequences of their actions in a manner they understood.” 106
This requirement is connected to the widespread practice used by social workers
to coerce Indian parents into “temporarily” waiving their parental rights in
exchange for welfare payments. 107 Further, regardless of state law on the issue,
the parents’ consent is invalid if given prior to, or within ten days after, the
child’s birth. 108 “Any parent or Indian custodian may withdraw consent to a
foster care placement under State law at any time and, upon such withdrawal,
the child shall be returned to the parent or Indian custodian.” 109 Further, in a
voluntary adoption proceeding, the consent of the parent may be withdrawn for

101. See Goldsmith, supra note 37, at 4 (internal quotations omitted).
102. See id. at 2. However, this interest in preventing the removal of children does not come at
a cost to the child’s welfare; rather, as exemplified in Holyfield, tribal courts have frequently
recognized that stability and continuity are important to a child’s well-being and have ruled in ways
that promote permanency in placements, even with non-Indian families. See ATWOOD, supra note
4, at 273–74.
103. See Hollinger, supra note 74, at 23.
104. Goldsmith, supra note 37, at 7–8.
105. See id. at 8.
106. PEVAR, supra note 27, at 296.
107. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386 at 11 (1978). Evidence of an Indian parent signing “temporary
custody” of their child over to the state could be used as evidence of neglect and grounds for
permanent termination of parental rights. Id.
108. Id. at 4.
109. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b) (1978).
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any reason, at any time prior to the final adoption decree. 110 After the entry of a
final decree of adoption of an Indian child in any State court, the parent may
withdraw consent on the grounds that consent was obtained through fraud or
duress, and may petition the court to vacate the adoption decree for up to two
years after the adoption is final. 111 However, the adoption of an Indian child may
not be vacated after the two-year period of collateral attack unless otherwise
permitted by state law. 112
Violating any provision of the ICWA carries a steep penalty even after an
adoption is final: an adoption can be invalidated. 113 At any time after an
adoption, the child, their parents, and their tribe may petition the court to
invalidate the adoption by showing the ICWA was violated. 114
VIII. THE 2016 FINAL RULE: BINDING GUIDELINES
The BIA’s 2016 Final Rule provides a binding, consistent, nationwide
interpretation of the ICWA’s minimum procedural and substantive standards. 115
The BIA has traditionally maintained a hands-off, non-binding approach to
promulgating the ICWA. 116 This hands-off approach is reflected in the first
iteration of non-binding guidelines, issued in 1979 and designed by Congress to
provide state courts guidance for applying the provisions of the ICWA. 117 State
courts have, nevertheless, maintained their autonomy in deciding cases under
the ICWA, which resulted in disparate outcomes and created conflicts such as
the existing Indian family doctrine, differing definitions of “active efforts” to
avoid separating a child from their family, and other areas of controversy within
the application of the ICWA. 118 After a period of public comment in 2014 and

110. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c) (1978).
111. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(d) (1978). This provision of the ICWA is connected to the identified
conflict between Indian and non-Indian social systems, which operated to defeat due process. H.R.
REP. NO. 95-1386 at 11 (1978). Because of the extended family’s role in child-rearing, it is common
in a tribal setting for a child to go away for a long period of time, thus the child’s immediate family
would not necessarily have an “immediate realization” that their child was removed by the state,
and would not act until “the opportunity for due process has slipped away.” Id.
112. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(d) (1978).
113. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1978). “Attorneys who fail to properly abide by the ICWA in facilitating
adoptions may be subject to civil liability to their client or to the tribe.” Gallagher, supra note 11,
at 91–92.
114. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1978). See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1978), which governs tribal jurisdiction;
25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1978), which governs notice; and 25 U.S.C. § 1913 (1978), which governs
consent.
115. Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
6 (2016); see also 25 C.F.R. § 23.106 (2018), which states that “[t]he regulations in this subpart
provide minimum Federal standards to ensure compliance with ICWA.”
116. Ogle, supra note 33, at 1011.
117. Id. at 1012.
118. Id. at 1013.
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2015, the BIA changed its approach and issued binding regulations on June 14,
2016, called the Final Rule. 119 Citing the special relationship between the United
States and the Indian tribes which Congress based their passage of the ICWA
on, the BIA notes in the Final Rule that the United States has a direct interest,
“as trustee,” in protecting Indian children who are members of, or are eligible
for membership within, an Indian tribe. 120 The binding nature of the Final Rule
was one of the issues raised by the Brackeen family in their challenge of the
ICWA.
IX. CHALLENGES TO THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
The constitutionality of the ICWA has been challenged before the Supreme
Court only a handful of times. In each case, the Court conducted a fact-specific
inquiry to determine whether the ICWA applied and if it did, whether it was
violated. The details matter when it comes to determining whether a child is an
Indian under the ICWA, and whether the lower courts adjudicated the adoption
proceedings properly. Overall, the ICWA “appear[ed] to work smoothly” when
a child’s Indian identity was uncontested, was made known early in the adoption
or custody proceedings, and when the tribe received timely notice and intervened
promptly. 121 However, the “hard cases” emerged when the child’s tribal identity
was unknown or uncovered late in the proceedings, when only one parent was a
member of an Indian tribe, and where one parent had either terminated parental
rights or abandoned the child. 122 Thus, to be solved effectively, these “hard
cases” must balance the welfare of an Indian child, the attenuated connections
to the tribal community, late intervention by tribal representatives, and nonIndian parties. 123
In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of voluntary adoption of Indian children from the perspective
of jurisdiction. On the other hand, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the Supreme
Court examined the detailed language of the law and determined that the ICWA
did not apply in the first place. In Brackeen v. Zinke, et. al, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas added another interpretive voice and
found that the ICWA itself was unconstitutional on multiple grounds. On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit preserved the ICWA and affirmed its role in resolving tensions
between tribes, biological parents, adoptive parents, and Indian children.

119. Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
5–6 (2016).
120. Id. at 6.
121. Atwood, supra note 26, at 623.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield

In Holyfield, the Court vacated a consensual adoption decree of two Indian
children born outside of a reservation and held that the ICWA mandated
exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over children domiciled on Indian
reservations. 124 Twin babies were born to enrolled members of the Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indian Tribe who resided on the reservation, but intentionally
gave birth to their children 200 miles away from the reservation. 125 The birth
parents consented to the adoption of the twins and they were formally adopted
by the Holyfields about one month after their birth, with no reference to the
ICWA or the Indian background of the children in the proceedings. 126 Two
months after the adoption, the tribe moved to vacate the adoption decree on the
grounds that the ICWA granted exclusive jurisdiction to tribal courts for the
adoption of any baby domiciled on an Indian reservation. 127 The lower court
denied the motion because the mother “went to some efforts” to give birth to the
children outside of the reservation, the adoption was arranged for promptly by
the birth parents, and the children never resided on the reservation. 128
The Supreme Court determined that the voluntary nature of the adoption did
not change the outcome of the case—tribal jurisdiction under the ICWA was not
meant to be defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe, because
in enacting the ICWA, Congress was concerned not solely with the impact on
Indian children and families, but also with the impact on the tribe as a whole.129
In reasoning that the voluntary nature of the adoption did not defeat the ICWA,
the Court acknowledged that the effect of placing Indian children outside their
tribal culture extended beyond the individuals involved. 130 Thus, the Court
124. 490 U.S. at 53.
125. Id. at 37. But see Goldsmith, supra note 37, at 5–6 (maintaining that the record in the
Holyfield case does not support the state court’s conclusion that “the Choctaw mother wanted to
avoid placement within the Choctaw reservation to provide her children with opportunities that the
reservation could not provide[,]” but rather that the Choctaw mother gave birth off the reservation
because there were no hospital facilities on the reservation); But see Watts, supra note 15, at 216
(citing Clarion-Ledger, May 24, 1988, at B2, col.1) (noting that the biological mother “felt that she
could not afford any more children and attempted to find a home for the twins on the reservation”
and “[a]lthough she did find couples who were willing to adopt one child, she could not find a
family on the reservation who would adopt both children”).
126. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37–38.
127. Id. at 38.
128. Id. at 39. In affirming the appellate court, the Supreme Court of Mississippi noted that the
twins “were voluntarily surrendered and legally abandoned by their natural parents to the adoptive
parents.” Id. at 40. The court also reiterated the effort the natural parents went to in order to prevent
the children from being placed on the reservation. Id.
129. Id. at 49.
130. Id. at 50; Kim, supra note 18, at 777; see also Watts, supra note 15, at 222 (pointing out
that voluntary adoption was among the problems considered by Congress in enacting the ICWA
because social workers were accused of using coercive methods, such as withholding welfare
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construed each provision of the ICWA as a means of protecting not only the
interests of the individual Indian children and their families, but also of the tribes
themselves. 131 The Court acknowledged the argument that the twins’ mother
went to great lengths to ensure her children could be adopted by the Holyfields,
however, the Court determined that “[p]ermitting individual members of the
tribe to avoid tribal exclusive jurisdiction by the simple expedient of giving birth
off the reservation would . . . nullify the purpose the ICWA was intended to
accomplish.” 132
While the meaning of domicile is not defined within the ICWA, the Court
reasoned that in enacting the ICWA, Congress confirmed that tribal court
jurisdiction was exclusive in child custody proceedings involving Indian
children domiciled on reservations. 133 In construing the meaning of the term
“domicile” and rejecting the argument that Congress left interpretation of this
term up to the individual state courts to decide, the Court reasoned that federal
statutes have an inherent purpose of uniformity across all state jurisdictions. 134
Further, the Court noted that Congress enacted the ICWA because it was
“concerned with the rights of Indian families and Indian communities vis-à-vis
state authorities[,]” and thus, Congress would not leave the determination of the
meaning of domicile up to the states to decide. 135 The Court reasoned that “[o]ne
acquires a ‘domicile of origin’ at birth, and that domicile continues until a new
one is acquired.” 136 Since “minors are legally incapable of forming the requisite
intent to establish a domicile,” their domicile is their parents’ domicile. 137 The
mother was undisputedly domiciled on the Choctaw reservation, and thus, the
Court determined that at their birth, the twins were also domiciled on the
reservation, even though they had never been there. 138

payments unless consent was given, and the “explosive demand for adoptable babies” often
produced financial rewards to poor Indian parents who could be persuaded to allow their children
to be adopted).
131. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49. Further, the Court reasoned that Congress determined to subject
the consensual adoption of Indian children to the ICWA’s jurisdictional and other provisions
“because of concerns going beyond the wishes of individual parents.” Id. at 50.
132. Id. at 51–52.
133. See id. at 42. See also Wis. Potowatomies of the Hannahville Indian Cmty. v. Houston,
393 F. Supp. 719, 721–22, 728 (1973) (holding that children of mixed Indian and non-Indian
parentage born off the reservation and who lived off the reservation for a period of time acquired
the residence and domicile of their natural father, whose domicile was the reservation, for the
purposes of determining jurisdiction in custody proceedings following the death of both parents).
134. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45–47.
135. Id. at 45.
136. Id. at 48.
137. Id. Further, the Court noted that in the case of an illegitimate child, the domicile of the
mother is the domicile of the child. Id.
138. Id. at 48–49. See also Kim, supra note 18, at 776–77 (noting that “[i]n the case of an
illegitimate child, courts have traditionally held the child’s domicile to be that of the mother,” and
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In closing, the Court sidestepped deciding the issue of the best interests of
the children, saying, “It is not ours to say whether the trauma that might result
from removing these children from their adoptive family should outweigh the
interest of the Tribe—and perhaps the children themselves—in having them
raised as part of the Choctaw community.” 139 Ultimately, the Court deferred the
responsibility of determining the best interests of the child to the experience,
wisdom, and compassion of the tribal courts. 140
The Court’s ruling in Holyfield illustrates the tension between individual
rights and tribal rights—what the dissent called a “delicate balance” of group
rights and individual rights recognized by the ICWA. 141 Justice Stevens’ dissent
advocated for a stronger position for individual autonomy and recognized the
possibility that Indian families can be better protected where Indian parents have
the freedom to choose who adopts their child. “Because [the mother]’s domicile
is on the reservation and the children are eligible for membership in the Tribe,
the Court today closes the state courthouse door to her.” 142 Highlighting an
alternative reading of Congress’ rationale for enacting the ICWA, Justice
Stevens reasoned that the purpose of the ICWA is to prevent the removal of
Indian children by nontribal public and private agencies. 143 Further, Justice
Stevens pointed out testimony in the congressional record asserting that by
allowing parents to choose a forum in which to sever their parent-child
relationship, the security of Indian families is promoted. 144 Justice Stevens
reasoned that when both parents deliberately abandon an Indian child to a person
off the reservation, no purpose of the ICWA is served by preventing the adoption
of an Indian child by non-Indian parents, because this choice represents an

therefore “in some cases, a child’s domicile of origin will be a place where the child has never
been”).
139. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 54. The Court acknowledged awareness of the three years that
passed since the twins were born and reasoned that “three years’ development of family ties cannot
be undone, and a separation at this point would doubtless cause considerable pain.” Id. at 53.
140. Id. at 54. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi was reversed, and the case
was remanded for further proceedings. Id. This deference, says the dissent, “establishes a rule of
law that is virtually certain to ensure that similar anguish will be suffered by other families in the
future.” Id. at 65. However, in the ensuing tribal court proceedings, the Choctaw tribal judge
confirmed adoption rights in favor of the Holyfield family after finding it was in the children’s best
interests to remain in the only home they had known. DUTHU, supra note 11, at 153. But see
Goldsmith, supra note 37, at 6–7, arguing that any potential anguish suffered by a child removed
from an adoptive home and returned to their tribe could be avoided had the state court followed the
mandates of the ICWA initially.
141. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 55.
142. Id. (Stevens, Rehnquist, and Kennedy dissenting).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 60–61.
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intentional invocation of state court jurisdiction and does not implicate an
interest in tribal self-governance. 145
B.

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the Supreme Court held that the provisions
of the ICWA barring involuntary termination of a parent’s rights absent a
heightened showing that serious harm to the Indian child is likely to result from
the parent’s “continued custody” of the child, did not apply because the parent
opposing termination of rights never had custody of the child. 146 Additionally,
the Court reasoned that the condition of showing that remedial efforts have been
made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family is inapplicable when the parent
abandoned the Indian child before birth and never had custody of the child. 147
Finally, the Court held that the provision of the ICWA “which provides
placement preferences for the adoption of Indian children, does not bar a nonIndian family . . . from adopting an Indian child when no other eligible
candidates have sought to adopt the child.” 148
In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, Baby Girl was born to a predominantly
Hispanic mother and a father who was an enrolled member of the Cherokee
Nation. 149 The couple was engaged for a six-month period and after their
relationship deteriorated, Birth Mother broke off the engagement several months
before Baby Girl was born. 150 Birth Mother sent Biological Father a text
message asking if he would rather pay child support or relinquish his parental
rights and Biological Father responded via text message that he relinquished his
rights. 151 During the pregnancy and the first four months after Baby Girl’s birth,
Biological Father provided no financial assistance to Birth Mother or Baby Girl,
even though he had the ability to do so; Biological Father “made no meaningful
attempts to assume his responsibility of parenthood.” 152 Birth Mother decided
to put Baby Girl up for adoption, and her attorney contacted the Cherokee Nation
to determine whether Biological Father was formally enrolled. 153 Birth Mother
selected Adoptive Couple, non-Indians living in South Carolina, to adopt Baby
Girl, and Adoptive Couple supported Birth Mother emotionally and financially

145. Id. at 63.
146. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013).
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2558.
150. Id.
151. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
152. Id.
153. Id. “The inquiry letter misspelled Biological Father’s first name and incorrectly stated his
birthday, and the Cherokee Nation responded that, based on the information provided, it could not
verify Biological Father’s membership in the tribal records.” Id.
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and were present at Baby Girl’s birth. 154 The day after Baby Girl’s birth, Birth
Mother relinquished her parental rights and consented to the adoption—
Adoptive Couple initiated adoption proceedings and returned with Baby Girl to
South Carolina. 155
Approximately four months after Baby Girl’s birth, Adoptive Couple served
Biological Father with notice of the pending adoption; Biological Father signed
papers stating that he accepted service and he was not contesting the adoption. 156
The day after signing papers, Biological Father contacted a lawyer and requested
a stay of the adoption proceedings, stating that he sought custody of his daughter
and did not consent to the adoption. 157 A trial took place two years later, and the
Family Court concluded that Adoptive Couple did not carry the heightened
burden under the ICWA “of proving that Baby Girl would suffer serious
emotional or physical damage if Biological Father had custody”—therefore,
Adoptive Couple’s petition for adoption was denied and Baby Girl was handed
over to Biological Father, whom she had never met. 158 On appeal, the South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s denial of the adoption
because Adoptive Couple did not show that “active efforts had been made to
provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the
breakup of the Indian family,” and the court concluded that Adoptive Couple
did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that Biological Father’s custody of
Baby Girl would result in serious emotional or physical harm to her. 159
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 1912(f) of the ICWA does
not apply to cases where the Indian parent never had custody of the Indian
child. 160 The Court reasoned that because the ICWA conditions the involuntary
termination of parental rights on a showing of the merits of continued custody
of the child by the parent, the use of the adjective “continued” plainly refers to
a pre-existing state of custody, in existence prior to the adoption proceeding. 161
Thus, since Biological Father did not already have custody of Baby Girl at the
time he contested her adoption, the ICWA did not apply to the adoption
proceedings. 162 Further, the Court noted that the primary mischief the ICWA
154. Id. Biological Mother selected Adoptive Couple via a private adoption agency. Id.
155. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
156. Id. “Biological Father later testified that, at the time he signed the papers, he thought that
he was relinquishing his rights to Birth Mother, not to Adoptive Couple.” Id.
157. Id. at 2558–59.
158. Id.
159. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2559.
160. Id. at 2560. See supra notes 71–75 (discussing the existing Indian family doctrine and its
use to determine that the ICWA only applies to prevent the removal of Indian children from their
Indian families, not the voluntary adoption of an Indian child by a non-Indian adoptive parent).
161. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560 (emphasis added). In dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that
he rejects the conclusion that continued custody must refer to custody in the past, instead of custody
in the future. Id. at 2571.
162. See id. at 2560–61.
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was designed to counteract was the unwarranted removal of Indian children from
Indian families due to cultural insensitivity and biases of social workers and state
courts. 163 Here, however, “the adoption of an Indian child [wa]s voluntarily and
lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent with sole custodial rights.” 164
Therefore, in the Court’s view, the ICWA’s primary goal of preventing the
unwarranted removal of Indian children and the dissolution of Indian families
was not implicated by this case. 165 This reasoning mirrors the existing Indian
family doctrine and interprets the ICWA as having the purpose of preserving
only existing Indian families. 166
Finally, the Court held that Section 1912(d) of the ICWA, which is designed
to prevent the breakup of Indian families, did not apply to the adoption of Baby
Girl because the Indian parent abandoned their Indian child prior to birth, and
that child had never been in the Indian parent’s legal or physical custody. 167
Thus, the Court determined there was no relationship that would be discontinued
and no effective family entity that would be ended by the termination of the
Indian parent’s rights. 168 While this is an arguably controversial interpretation
of the ICWA, the Court’s decision is consistent with precedent that generally
confers “‘parental status’ only on unwed fathers who have established a parental
relationship with their children.” 169 Thus, the Court reasoned, the “breakup of
the Indian family” had long since occurred, and Section 1912(d) was
inapplicable. 170 Further, the Court found that were Section 1912(d) to apply to a
proceeding in which an Indian parent abandoned their child, as in the case of
Baby Girl, it would dissuade prospective adoptive parents from seeking to adopt
Indian children and would “unnecessarily place vulnerable Indian children at a
unique disadvantage in finding a permanent and loving home, even in cases
where neither an Indian parent nor the relevant tribe objects to the adoption. 171

163. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2561 (emphasis added).
164. Id.
165. Id. See also supra notes 71–75, discussing the existing Indian family doctrine.
166. See supra notes 71–75, discussing the existing Indian family doctrine and its role in state
court child custody proceedings.
167. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2562.
168. Id. The Court’s decision here is in accord with the statutory definition of “parent” given
in the ICWA, which specifically excludes “the unwed father where paternity has not been
acknowledged or established.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9).
169. Gallagher, supra note 11, at 90. See also Michael v. Gerald, 491 U.S. 110, 119–20 (1989)
(finding that societal traditions protect a biological mother and adoptive father against the filial
claim of a child’s biological father); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250–51, 265 (1983) (holding
that a putative father’s due process and equal protection rights were not violated by the state’s
failure to notify him of adoption proceedings because he could have taken action to register as the
child’s father).
170. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2562.
171. Id. at 2563–2564.
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In opposition to the ICWA’s opening provision declaring Congress’ plenary
power to legislate on issues related to Indian affairs, Justice Thomas wrote in
concurrence that the Indian Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to
regulate commerce with Indian tribes, but not with individual Indian persons. 172
Further, Thomas reasoned that commerce does not include noneconomic
activity, such as the adoption of children. 173 Thomas reasoned that “[n]othing in
the Indian Commerce Clause permits Congress to enact special laws applicable
to Birth Father merely because of his status as an Indian.” 174 This reasoning
resurfaces to play a central part in the District Court’s findings in the Brackeen’s
case.
C. Brackeen et. al, v. Bernhardt et. al
In late 2018, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas held in Brackeen et. al., v. Zinke, et. al., that the ICWA was
unconstitutional because adoption preferences for Indian children violate equal
protection, the non-delegation doctrine, and the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering requirements. 175 The court also determined that the specific
classification of children under the ICWA was impermissible because as a racial
classification, it failed to pass strict scrutiny. 176 Since the court found the ICWA
unconstitutional, it held that the BIA lacked statutory authority to enact the 2016
Final Rule and therefore granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment. 177 Following this ruling, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral
arguments on the case in March 2019, and reversed the district court’s findings
on August 9, 2019. The plaintiffs continue their appeal process, and as of the
time of this writing, a rehearing en banc was granted by the 5th Circuit on
November 7, 2019. 178
While courts have previously been able to sidestep many constitutional
challenges to the ICWA, this case presented an opportunity for the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals to address these issues head on and acknowledge Congress’
plenary power to regulate Indian affairs. Ultimately, in ruling against the
Brackeens, the Fifth Circuit solidified the ICWA’s protection of Indian children,
families, and tribes. The analysis below addresses the plaintiffs’ arguments

172. Id. at 2567. Later, Justice Thomas reasoned that the portions of the ICWA at issue in this
case regulate individuals, not “Indian tribes as tribes,” since portions of the ICWA apply to all child
custody proceedings involving any Indian child, regardless of whether an Indian tribe is involved.
Id. at 2570.
173. Id. at 2567.
174. Id. at 2570.
175. 338 F. Supp. 3d at 536, 538, 541.
176. Id. at 533–34.
177. Id. at 546.
178. See Deutch, supra note 5. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 942 F.3d 287 (Mem) (5th Cir. 2019).
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before the district court, and the Fifth Circuit’s resolution of the issues on
appeal. 179
1.

Overview of the Plaintiffs and Claims in Zinke

In Zinke, the plaintiffs were three states—Texas, Louisiana, and Indiana—
and seven individual plaintiffs, including Chad and Jennifer Brackeen; Nick and
Heather Libretti; Altagracia Hernandez; and Jason and Danielle Clifford. 180
Shortly after the case was initially filed, the Cherokee Nation, Oneida Nation,
Quinault Indian Nation, and the Morongo Band of Mission Indians filed an
unopposed motion to intervene, which the court granted. 181
In the case before the district court, the plaintiffs made three arguments:
first, that the ICWA and its accompanying regulations implemented a system
that mandates racial and ethnic preferences in direct violation of state and federal
law. 182 Second, that the ICWA was “unconstitutional under Article One and the
Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution” because its provisions
violated the Commerce Clause, intruded into state domestic relations, and
violated the anti-commandeering principle. 183 Individual plaintiffs also argued
that the ICWA was unconstitutional in violation of the equal protection
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment and asked that the ICWA be declared
unconstitutional in violation of substantive due process. 184
By joining together multiple prospective adoptive families, the individual
plaintiffs presented a “hard case” which illustrated the tensions between tribes,
states, adoptive families, and Indian parents in the context of the ICWA. After
the district court ruled that the ICWA was unconstitutional on multiple grounds
and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs and
rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. 185
Chad and Jennifer Brackeen sought to adopt A.L.M., who was born to an
unmarried couple and placed with the Brackeens through the state foster care

179. This article does not discuss State Plaintiffs’ Tenth Amendment and anti-commandeering
claims.
180. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 519. Defendants include the U.S. Department of the Interior and
Secretary Ryan Zinke; the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and Director Bryan Rice; the BIA
Principal Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, John Tahsuda III; and the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services and Secretary Alex Azar. Id. at 519–20.
181. Id. at 520.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 441 (2019). The district court and the Fifth Circuit addressed
standing issues raised by the defendants in their appeal, however the focus of this note is several of
the constitutional issues addressed by the courts. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s ruling that Plaintiffs had standing to raise their arguments. Id.
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system when he was ten months old. 186 A.L.M. is eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe because his biological mother is an enrolled member of the Navajo
Nation and his biological father is an enrolled member of the Cherokee
Nation. 187 The Cherokee Nation and the Navajo Nation were notified of
A.L.M.’s placement with the Brackeens, and after sixteen months of living with
the Brackeens and with the support of his paternal grandmother and biological
parents, the Brackeens sought to adopt A.L.M. 188 These facts illustrate the
tensions that arise where the individual preferences of the child’s Indian family
members diverge from the ICWA’s regulations and the preference of the tribe.
In May 2017, a Texas state court terminated parental rights of A.L.M.’s
biological parents and shortly thereafter, one year after the Brackeens took
custody of A.L.M., the Navajo nation notified the state court that it had located
a potential alternative placement with non-relatives of A.L.M. in New
Mexico. 189 Similar to the state court ruling in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
which returned Baby Girl to Biological Father whom she had never met, this
proposed placement would have moved A.L.M. away from both his biological
parents and the only home he had ever known. 190 In July 2017, the Brackeens
filed a petition to adopt A.L.M., and the Cherokee and Navajo Nations were
notified of the adoption proceeding, though no tribe, nor any tribal member,
intervened or sought to adopt A.L.M. 191
The Brackeens argued in state court that the ICWA’s placement preferences
should not apply because they were the only party seeking to adopt A.L.M., and
thus good cause existed to depart from the ICWA’s preferences for adoptive
placement with an Indian family. 192 To show good cause to depart from the
preferences, the Brackeens submitted testimony by A.L.M.’s biological parents,
his court appointed guardian, and an expert in psychology. 193 The court denied
their petition to adopt A.L.M. at that time, but in January 2018, the Brackeens
successfully petitioned to adopt A.L.M. 194 However, under the ICWA and the
2016 Final Rule, this adoption remains open to collateral attack for two years. 195
The Brackeens explained that in light of these proceedings, they are now
186. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 525. Though the Brackeens were told on their “first chaotic day
with A.L.M. . . . that he was an American Indian child,” they were unaware of the traumatic history
of the removal of Native American children from their families, the ICWA, or what implications
A.L.M.’s status as an Indian child would have on their future adoption of him. See Deutch, supra
note 5.
187. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 525.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 526.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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reluctant to provide foster care for other Indian children in the future; therefore,
the Brackeens argued that the ICWA and the 2016 Final Rule interfere with their
intention and ability to provide a home to additional children, and this legal
regime harms Texas’s interests by limiting the supply of available, qualified
homes necessary to help foster care children in general, and Indian children in
particular. 196
The Libretti family’s adoption of Baby O illustrates the tension between
tribal interests and the interests of adoptive parents under the ICWA. The
Libretti family sought to adopt Baby O when she was born in March 2016. 197
Ms. Hernandez, Baby O’s mother, felt that she would be unable to care for Baby
O and wished to place her for adoption at her birth, though she has continued to
be a part of Baby O’s life and she and the Librettis visit each other regularly. 198
Baby O’s biological father descends from members of the Pueblo Tribe of El
Paso Texas, but at the time of Baby O’s birth, he was not a registered member
of the tribe. 199 The Pueblo Tribe intervened in the Nevada custody proceedings
in an effort to remove Baby O from the Librettis, but when the Librettis joined
the action before the district court, the tribe indicated a willingness to settle in a
way that would permit the Librettis to adopt Baby O. 200 Ultimately, the Pueblo
Tribe agreed not to contest the Librettis’ adoption of Baby O, and on December
19, 2018, the Nevada state court issued a decree of adoption, declaring that the
Librettis were Baby O’s lawful parents. 201 The Librettis pointed out that the
settlement would be open to collateral attack for two years under the ICWA, and
alleged that while they intend to provide foster care for, and possibly adopt,
additional children in need, they are reluctant to foster Indian children after this
experience. 202
196. Id. The Brackeens are petitioning to adopt another Indian child: A.L.M.’s baby sister, who
is currently residing with a Native American family member in another state. The Navajo Nation
recently located the girl’s great aunt, who lives on a reservation in Arizona and would be willing
to adopt her. However, the Brackeens still think they’re the right choice, so the baby can be with
her brother. See Deutch, supra note 5. In ruling on the adoption of A.L.M.’s sister, a Texas court
granted the Brackeens’ motion to declare the ICWA inapplicable as a violation of the Texas
constitution, but has refrained from ruling on the Brackeens’ claims under the United States
Constitution, pending the Fifth Circuit’s resolution of the claims pending in A.L.M.’s case.
Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 423.
197. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 526.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 419.
202. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 526–27. Further, according to plaintiffs’ complaint, plaintiff
Altagracia Hernandez brings this action because the ICWA and the 2016 Final Rule are interfering
with her wishes to have her biological child adopted in a placement that best suits Baby O’s interests
and needs. First Amended Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5,
Brackeen v. Zinke, No. 4:17-cv-868-O (N.D. Tex. 2018) (Dkt. No. 22). See also Bernhardt, 937
F.3d at 419.
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The Clifford family’s adoption of Child P illustrates the tension of balancing
the preferences of extended family members, tribes, and adoptive families under
the ICWA. The Clifford family sought to adopt Child P, whose grandmother is
a registered member of the White Earth Band of Ojibwe Tribe. 203 “Child P is a
member of the White Earth Band for the purposes of the ICWA only.”204
Because the ICWA placement preferences applied, county officials removed
Child P from the Clifford’s custody and placed Child P in the care of her
maternal grandmother, whose foster license was revoked in January 2018. 205
Child P’s guardian ad litem supported the Clifford’s efforts to adopt her and
agreed that the adoption is in Child P’s best interest, “[h]owever, due to the
application of the ICWA, the Cliffords and Child P remain separated and the
Cliffords face heightened legal barriers to adopt Child P.” 206 On January 17,
2019, the Minnesota court denied the Clifford’s motion for adoptive
placement. 207 Even if the Cliffords adopted Child P, that adoption could be
collaterally attacked for two years under the ICWA. 208
2.

The Indian Commerce Clause

The constitutionality of the ICWA as a valid act of Congress under the
Indian Commerce Clause is both a threshold issue and an underlying element to
the analysis of the plaintiffs’ other claims. Before the district court, the parties
disagreed as to whether Congress properly exercised its power when enacting
the ICWA. Plaintiffs claimed that “Congress did not have the constitutional
authority to pass Sections 1901–23 and Sections 1951–52 of the ICWA under
the Indian Commerce Clause.” 209 Defendants argued that Congress’ grant of
authority over Indian tribes is plenary. 210 In explaining the context and
regulations of the ICWA, the Fifth Circuit noted that Congress has plenary
power over Indian affairs, however, the court also tied its ruling to other modes
of constitutional analysis. 211
Congress’ absolute and plenary authority over Indian matters is grounded in
long-standing legal precedent. 212 The Supreme Court has affirmed this broad,
203. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 527.
204. Id.
205. Id. According to plaintiffs’ complaint, Child P’s grandmother was “determined. . . unfit to
serve as a foster placement, and who has limited rights over Child P under state law.” First
Amended Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Brackeen v. Zinke, No.
4:17-cv-868-O (N.D. Tex. 2018) (Dkt. No. 22).
206. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 527.
207. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 420.
208. Zinke, 338 F. Supp 3d at 527.
209. Id. at 546.
210. Id. The district court rejected defendants’ argument. Id.
211. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 416.
212. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974) (describing the attachment of the plenary
power of Congress with respect to the Indian Tribes to the Indian Commerce Clause and its
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plenary authority attached to the Indian Commerce Clause in multiple cases.213
The legislative history of the ICWA reveals Congress’ own consideration of
whether the regulation of child custody proceedings and the imposition of
minimum federal standards is an appropriate exercise of Congress’ plenary
power over Indian affairs. 214 In settling this issue, Congress determined,
pursuant to the Court’s holding in Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908),
that as long as Indians remain a distinct people, with an existing tribal
organization recognized by the government, “Congress has power to say with
whom, and on what terms, they shall deal.” 215 Further, Congress reasoned in
enacting the ICWA, that even as state courts at that time had recognized that a
tribe’s children are vital to its integrity and future, Congress has the
responsibility to protect the integrity of the tribes and thus, pursuant to the
Court’s holding in United States v. Kagama, “there arises the duty of protection,
and with it the power.” 216
In affirming Congress’ broad power to regulate tribal affairs under the
Indian Commerce Clause, the Court has also recognized that this plenary power,
combined with the “semi-independent position” of Indian tribes, creates two
formidable barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal
reservations and members. 217 First, the exercise of regulatory authority may be
affirmation by the Supreme Court); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004)
(finding that “Congress, with this Court’s approval, has interpreted the Constitution’s ‘plenary’
grants of power as authorizing it to enact legislation that both restricts and, in turn, relaxes those
restrictions on tribal sovereign authority”). Additionally, the legislative history of the ICWA
acknowledges the plenary power of Congress to act with regard to Indian affairs, relying on the
Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Wheeler, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 1084 (1978) (acknowledging
the undisputed plenary power of Congress to regulate the Indian tribes) and United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
213. Ogle, supra note 33, at 1017 (citing Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 and arguing that the Constitution
grants Congress broad general powers to legislate with respect to Indian tribes). See also
Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470–71
(1979) (noting that Congress has a “plenary and exclusive” power over Indian affairs when deciding
an issue of jurisdiction); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)
(establishing that the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with
plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian Affairs, while also pointing out that this central
function is different from the central function of the Commerce Clause, which is to regulate
commerce among the several states).
214. H.R. Rᴇᴘ. Nᴏ. 95-1386 at 14 (1978).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 15. See also Watts, supra note 15, at 224 (pointing out that “[b]y giving tribal
governments more influence in [child custody proceedings] and restricting state courts
jurisdictionally, procedurally, and substantively, Congress acknowledged its role as a trustee in
protecting Indian tribes and their children,” while also returning a degree of self-determination to
tribes in “an area perceived as fundamentally important by both tribes and Congress”).
217. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). See also Kagama,
118 U.S. at 384–85 (justifying the plenary power of Congress to regulate Indian Affairs as
“necessary to their protection,” and grounded in the rationale that “[i]t must exist in [the general
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pre-empted by federal law. 218 Additionally, state regulatory authority may
unlawfully infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them. 219 In recognizing this tension, the Court notes that the
right of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent on, and subject to, the
broad power of Congress. 220
While the Supreme Court has continually recognized the plenary power of
Congress to regulate Indian affairs, Justice Thomas authored a series of opinions
advancing an argument that Congress has limited or weak powers to regulate
Indian affairs. 221 In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, Justice Thomas interpreted
Congress’ history with respect to the Indian tribes narrowly and reasoned that
because at the time of the writing of the Constitution commerce did not include
agriculture and manufacturing, it certainly does not include “noneconomic
activity such as adoption of children.” 222 Additionally, the drafting process of
the Indian Commerce Clause reveals that the original draft contained the phrase
“Indian affairs,” instead of “commerce with Indian tribes,” and as such, Justice
Thomas concluded that the preference of the drafters was to restrict Congress’
power over the Indian tribes to the regulation of commerce only. 223 Justice
Thomas also pointed out that the Indian Commerce Clause expressly contains
the word “tribes” as opposed to “individuals” or “persons,” and therefore, he
reasoned that Congress does not have power to regulate the adoption of
individual Indian children. 224
On the other hand, in United States v. Lara, the Court acknowledged that
the origins of Indian affairs are more rooted in aspects of military and foreign
policy than in domestic or municipal law. 225 Similarly, the Court in Morton v.
Mancari found that the plenary power of Congress to deal with the special
problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution
itself and thus singles out Indians as a proper subject for separate legislation by
Congress. 226 Thus, Congress’ legislative authority would rest at least in part, not
only on “affirmative grants of the Constitution,” like the Indian Commerce
government] because it never has existed anywhere else; because the theater of its exercise is within
the geographical limits of the United States; because it has never been denied; and because it alone
can enforce its laws on all the tribes.”).
218. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 142.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 143.
221. See United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968 (2016) (Justice Thomas in concurrence
wrote that “[n]o enumerated powernot Congress’ power to ‘regulate Commerce . . . with Indian
Tribes,’ not the Senate’s role in approving treaties, nor anything elsegives Congress such
sweeping authority” as to have plenary power over Indian tribes).
222. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2567 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004).
226. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974).
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Clause, but upon the Constitution’s adoption of pre-constitutional powers
necessarily inherent in the Federal government. 227 Further, the Court in United
States v. Lara recognized that from the nation’s beginning, Congress’ need for
a plenary legislative power over Indian tribes would have “seemed obvious” due
to the fluctuating nature of billions of acres of land, numerous tribes with distinct
cultures, and policies toward Indians which ranged from “removal” and
“termination” to “government-to-government relationship” and “development
of strong and stable tribal governments.” 228 A full consideration of legislative
history, coupled with two centuries of congressional action and Court approval,
supports the constitutionality of the ICWA as enacted pursuant to Congress’
express authority under the Indian Commerce Clause and implicit authority in
the context of Indian affairs. 229
3.

The Non-Delegation Doctrine: Section 1915(c) and The Final Rule

Before the district court, the State Plaintiffs argued that Section 1915(c) of
the ICWA was unconstitutional because it delegated congressional power to
Indian tribes in violation of Article I of the Constitution. 230 Contrary to the
longstanding history of Congress’ regulation of Indian affairs and recognition of
Indian tribes as quasi-sovereign, 231 State Plaintiffs argued that Section 1915(c)
of the ICWA impermissibly granted Indian tribes the authority to reorder
Congress’ enacted adoption placement preferences by tribal decree, and then
apply their preferred order to states in state court custody proceedings. 232
Additionally, State Plaintiffs argued that several sections of the 2016 Final Rule
implemented an unconstitutional statute; exceeded the scope of the Interior
Department’s statutory regulatory authority to enforce the ICWA with binding
regulations; and reflected an impermissible construction of several terms within
the ICWA. 233
“Distinguishing between permissible and non-permissible delegations of
congressional power usually requires asking whether Congress is delegating
discretion to create law or discretion to execute law.” 234 “In a delegation
challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated

227. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201.
228. Id. at 202.
229. For a full discussion of the Indian Commerce Clause and its predicted effect on the
proceedings in the Bernhardt case, see generally Ogle, supra note 33 at 1017, 1018.
230. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 536 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (quoting U.S. CONST. art
I, § 1, cl. 1.) (“All legislative Powers. . . shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”).
231. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386 at 7536–37, 7559 (1978).
232. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 425 (2019)
233. Id. at 437.
234. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 536 (citing Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996)).
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legislative power to the agency.” 235 Congress cannot delegate its inherent power
to formulate binding rules generally applicable to private individuals, however,
Congress may grant a federal agency the regulatory power necessary to execute
legislation as well as interpret ambiguities therein. 236
The district court reasoned that under the ICWA, the tribes were granted
power to change the legislative preferences Congress enacted in the ICWA, and
those changes made by the tribes then became binding on the states. 237 Thus, the
district court determined that the power to change specifically-enacted
congressional priorities related to the adoption of Indian children, and the power
to impose those changes on third parties, could only be described as legislative,
and accordingly, the district court found that Section 1915(c) of the ICWA and
Section 23.130(b) of the Final Rule violated the non-delegation doctrine. 238 The
district court reasoned that Congress impermissibly granted federal regulatory
power to Indian tribes via the ICWA and the 2016 Final Rule because an Indian
tribe is not a coordinate branch of government, nor part of the federal
government at all. 239
On appeal, the defendants refocused the non-delegation analysis on
sovereignty. 240 The defendants contended that Section 1915 of the ICWA
recognized and incorporated a tribe’s exercise of its inherent sovereignty over
Indian childrentherefore, it did not, and could not, delegate this existing
sovereign authority to Indian tribes at all. 241 This argument was in line with other
judicial interpretations of tribal sovereignty, 242 and the Fifth Circuit’s holding in
235. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 435 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472
(2001)).
236. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 536.
237. Id. at 537.
238. Id.; 25 C.F.R. § 23.130 (2018) addresses the application of placement preferences in
adoptive placement of Indian children, requiring that if the Indian child’s tribe has established by
resolution a different order of preference for adoption than that specified in the ICWA, the tribe’s
placement preferences apply. GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT,
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 56 (2016). Further, “resolution” can include a statement by a
competent Tribal authority as well as a Tribal-State agreement laying out an objective order of
placement preferences. Id.
239. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 537. But see Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third
Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1 (1997) (calling Indian tribes one of the three
sovereign entities in the United States).
240. See Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 435.
241. Id.
242. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 (1974) (noting a special commitment of
Congress to turn over to the Indians a greater control of their own destinies); see also Native Village
of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 556 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 232 (1982 ed.) (Indian tribes have consistently been
recognized as “‘distinct, independent political communities’ qualified to exercise powers of selfgovernment, not by virtue of any delegation of powers, but rather by reason of their original tribal
sovereignty.”)); see also O’Connor, supra note 239, at 1 (noting that the United States has three
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Bernhardt quietly, but clearly, affirmed the role of tribal sovereignty in
American jurisprudence.
In deciding the issue of non-delegation with respect to Section 1915(c) of
the ICWA, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that the Supreme Court has long
recognized that Congress may incorporate the laws of another sovereign into
federal law without violating the non-delegation doctrine. 243 The Fifth Circuit’s
analysis of non-delegation smartly tied together various Court rulings on several
areas of Indian affairs and built a consistent interpretation of sovereignty and
Indian tribes within the law. Although some exercises of tribal power require
express congressional delegation, the Court cited past decisions that indicate that
tribes may “retain their inherent power to determine tribal membership and to
regulate domestic relations among members.” 244 Analyzing the issue of
adoption through the lens of the alcoholic beverage laws in Mazurie, the court
reasoned that like the tribes in Mazurie who passed laws to regulate the
introduction and use of intoxicants within their reservation’s bounds, here, tribes
may use their own legislative authority to reorder the preferences set forth by
Congress in Section 1915(a) of the ICWA. 245 Pursuant to Section 1915(a), a tribe
may assess whether the most appropriate placement for an Indian child is with
the members of the child’s extended family, the child’s tribe, or other Indian
families, and thereby exercise its “‘inherent power to determine tribal
membership and regulate domestic relations among members’ and Indian
children eligible for membership.” 246
State Plaintiffs argued that Mazurie was distinguishable because it involved
the exercise of tribal authority on tribal lands, whereas the ICWA permitted the
extension of tribal authority over states and persons on non-tribal
landspersons like the Brackeens, the Librettis, and the Cliffords. 247 However,
the Fifth Circuit remained focused on children as members of Indian tribes and
determined that “it is well established that tribes have ‘sovereignty over both
their members and their territory,’” and reasoned that “[f]or a tribe to exercise
its authority to determine tribal membership and to regulate domestic relations
among its members, it must necessarily be able to regulate all Indian children,
types of sovereign entities—the Federal government, the States, and the Indian tribes, and that each
sovereign plays an important role in the administration of justice in the United States).
243. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 436 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)
(“[I]ndependent tribal authority is quite sufficient to protect Congress’ decision to vest in tribal
councils this portion of its own authority ‘to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian tribes.’”) and
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 80 (1824) (“Although Congress cannot enable a State to legislate,
Congress may adopt the provisions of a State on any subject.”)).
244. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 436–37. The Court also cited past decisions indicating that tribes
retain the power to create substantive law governing internal tribal affairs like tribal citizenship and
child custody. Id.
245. Id. at 436.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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irrespective of their location.” 248 Thus, the court found that “by recognizing the
inherent powers of tribal sovereigns to determine by resolution the order of
placement preferences applicable to an Indian child,” Congress was deliberately
continuing to adopt tribal law as binding federal law. 249 Thus, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that Section 1915(c) was not an unconstitutional delegation of
congressional legislative power to tribes, but was instead an incorporation of
inherent tribal authority by Congress. 250 This ruling recognized the heart of the
ICWA: protecting and preserving Indian children and their relationships with
their tribes.
While the district court in Brackeen v. Zinke grounded its analysis of the
2016 Final Rule in the constitutionality of the ICWA itself, the Fifth Circuit
considered the 2016 Final Rule’s basis in the ICWA, the BIA’s scope of
authority, and the construction of the statute. The Fifth Circuit’s analysis began
with affirming the overall constitutionality of the ICWA and acknowledging that
Congress granted the Secretary of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs
the broad authority to promulgate regulations necessary to the ICWA’s
implementation. 251
The Fifth Circuit conceded that the plain language of the ICWA may be
considered ambiguous because Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question of the 2016 Final Rule and other regulations promulgated by the
BIA. 252 However, the court found that the Final Rule’s binding standards for
Indian child custody proceedings were reasonable because they were reasonably
related to the ICWA’s purpose of establishing minimum federal standards in
child custody proceedings involving Indian children. 253
The Fifth Circuit rightly framed the issue of Congress’ delegation of
rulemaking authority to the BIA around the legal test of reasonableness set out
in Chevron. However, there is an important practical issue resolved by the
application of this test. The 2016 Final Rule was promulgated by the BIA—after
research, public comment, and tribal consultations—because of the lack of
uniformity in state court interpretation of the ICWA and the resulting
inconsistencies in child custody proceedings. 254 Congress’ delegation of

248. Id.
249. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 437.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 438.
253. Id.
254. Ogle, supra note 33, at 1016. In considering whether the BIA’s issuance of binding
guidelines in 2016 was reasonable in light of their previous issuance of non-binding guidelines, the
Fifth Circuit noted that in the past, “the BIA had neither the benefit of the Holyfield Court’s
carefully reasoned decision nor the opportunity to observe how a lack of uniformity in the
interpretation of ICWA by State courts could undermine the statute’s underlying purposes.”
Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 439.
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rulemaking authority to the BIA was borne of necessity—without the 2016 Final
Rule, state courts would continue to implement divergent and inconsistent
interpretations of the ICWA and its preference categories. Congress’ delegation
of rulemaking authority to the BIA was valid because it was practically
necessary to execute the ICWA in the manner Congress intended. 255
4.

The Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Claim and Classification
Under Mancari

The parties disagreed about whether Sections 1915(a)-(b) relied on racial
classifications that required strict scrutiny review. 256 Plaintiffs argued that the
ICWA provides special rules in child placement proceedings based on the race
of the child, which was permissible only if the race-based distinctions survived
strict scrutiny. 257 On the other hand, the federal and tribal defendants disagreed,
contending that the ICWA distinguishes children based on political categories,
which required only a rational basis review. 258 This section analyzes the Fifth
Circuit’s resolution of this issue, which found that the ICWA’s definition of
“Indian child” was a political classification, subject to rational basis review, and
did not violate Equal Protection. 259 The analysis below argues that the
classifications in the ICWA would survive even strict scrutiny.
To survive strict scrutiny review, “federal racial classifications, like those of
a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly
tailored to further that interest.” 260 On the other hand, under rational basis
review, “when a federal statute governing Indians relies on political
classifications, the legislation is permissible if singling out Indians for
‘particular and special treatment’ is ‘tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.’” 261 In evaluating an equal
protection claim, strict scrutiny applies to laws that rely on classifications of
persons based on race, but where the classification is political, rational basis
review applies. 262

255. Ogle, supra note 33, at 1016. The initial authority granted by the ICWA to the BIA
required the BIA to promulgate guidelines within 180 days, though the Fifth Circuit determines the
promulgation of binding guidelines in 2016 has a rational explanation that does not make them
invalid due to the timing of their release. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 439.
256. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 531 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
257. Id. (emphasis added).
258. Id. (emphasis added).
259. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 429–30.
260. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 531 (quoting Richard v. Hinson, 70 F.3d 415, 417 (5th Cir.
1995)).
261. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 531 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554–55 (1974)).
See also Watts, supra note 15, at 229 (supporting the idea that the ICWA would survive a rational
basis standard of review).
262. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 425.
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Plaintiffs argued that the placement preferences in Sections 1915(a)-(b) of
the ICWA, as well as the collateral attack provisions in Section 1913(d) and
Section 1914, included unlawful race-based classifications like those at issue in
Rice v. Cayetano. 263 In Rice, the Court found that “ancestry can be a proxy for
race” and noted that “racial discrimination is that which singles out ‘identifiable
classes of persons . . . solely because of their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics.” 264 On the other hand, the federal and tribal defendants argued
that the ICWA’s placement preferences relied on political classifications like the
statute at issue in Morton v. Mancari. 265 In Mancari, the Supreme Court upheld
the statute’s preference for Indian applicants as a hiring criterion within a
government agency because the statute applied only to members of federallyrecognized tribes, which provided special treatment only to Indians living on or
near reservations. 266 Noting that on numerous occasions the Supreme Court
specifically upheld legislation singling out Indians for particular and special
treatment, the Court in Mancari determined that the employment preference was
granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but rather as members of quasisovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities were governed by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs and Congress in a unique fashion. 267 Reasoning that the
preference was not directed toward a “racial” group consisting of “Indians,” but
rather only toward members of “federally recognized” tribes, the Court
determined that this category could exclude many individuals who are racially
classified as Indians, and thus, it was a political rather than racial preference. 268
In deciding to apply the strict scrutiny test in Zinke, the district court
reasoned that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mancari was uniquely tailored to
that particular set of facts, and Mancari did not announce all preferences
263. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 531. In Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), the Supreme
Court overturned a Hawaiian statute restricting voter eligibility to only “native Hawaiians” and
those with “Hawaiian ancestry.” Id. at 531–32. The Supreme Court reasoned that extending
Mancari to the Hawaiian context “would be to permit a State, by racial classification, to fence out
whole classes of its citizens from decision making in critical state affairs.” See ATWOOD, supra
note 4, at 191. However, scholars point out that the ICWA, on the other hand, embodies Congress’
intent to benefit Indian children as tribal members and protect tribal sovereignty and survival. Id.
Thus, “[u]nlike the scheme involved in Rice, tribal self-government is directly served by the
jurisdictional and procedural protections afforded to tribes under the” ICWA. Id.
264. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 532 (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 496 (2000)).
Scholars argue that whether or not a tribe chooses to include a blood quantum requirement in its
membership criteria should not affect the political meaning of tribal membership under equal
protection theory. ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 190.
265. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 532. In Mancari, plaintiffs sought to declare unconstitutional a
BIA hiring standard that gave preference to Indian applicants. Id.
266. Id.
267. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553–54 (1974) (emphasis added). Decided just a few
years before the ICWA was enacted by Congress, the Mancari Court acknowledges the important
relationship Congress has with Indian tribes. Id. at 552–53.
268. Id. at 554 n.24.
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involving Indians are political. 269 Therefore, the Zinke court reasoned that
because the ICWA’s definition of Indian children deferred to the tribal
membership eligibility standards rather than actual tribal affiliation, the ICWA
used ancestry as a proxy for race, as in Rice, and therefore was subject to the
strict scrutiny test. 270
Contrary to the Zinke court’s reasoning, Mancari contains no language
limiting its holding to its particular set of facts or to only Indians living on
reservations, and the Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that Mancari controlled
the classification issues in Bernhardt. 271 While the Supreme Court has declined
to extend the Mancari doctrine to other racial or ethnic groups, 272 the issue in
Bernhardt involved the classification of Indian children in an analogous manner
to the classification in Mancari, and the Fifth Circuit indicated that Mancari’s
holding did not “rise or fall with the geographical location of the Indians
receiving ‘special treatment.’” 273 The Fifth Circuit grounded its analysis in the
foundational concept that Congress has exercised plenary power over tribal
relations from “the beginning,” and this exercise of power has always been
deemed political and not subject to control by the judiciary. 274 Thus, the district
court created a false distinction in Congress’s power to legislate Indian affairs
by distinguishing between Indians living on reservations and those that do not. 275
“The Supreme Court’s decisions ‘leave no doubt that federal legislation with
respect to Indian tribes . . . is not based upon impermissible racial
classifications.’” 276 Like the statute at issue in Mancari, the ICWA relies on a
definition of “Indian” that requires tribal acknowledgement of membership (or
eligibility for membership), and in doing so, makes the classification political
and not racial. “Membership in a tribe, while often resting on requirements of
ancestry, gives rise to certain political rights,” including “rights to participate in
tribal decision making, to receive tribal benefits, and to reside on tribal land.” 277
Membership in a tribe is consensual in nature 278 and one of a tribe’s most basic
269. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 532.
270. Id. at 533–34.
271. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 427.
272. See Metteer, infra note 280, at 56.
273. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 427.
274. Id. at 426 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903)). The court also cites
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552, pointing out that “[i]f these laws, derived from historical relationships
and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire
Title of the United States Code would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the
Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.” Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 426. See also Perrin
v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 482 (1914) (acknowledging Congress’s power to regulate Indians
“whether upon or off a reservation and whether within or without the limits of a state”).
275. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 427.
276. Id. at 426 (quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977)).
277. ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 190–91.
278. Id. at 192.
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sovereign powers is the right to determine their own membership, which creates
a political status in which Indians are citizens of two sovereign powers—the
United States and their tribe. 279 Some scholars assert that tribal members often
see the tribes’ exercise of power over their children as a “core manifestation of
tribal sovereignty.” 280 Further, like the statute in Mancari, the definition of
“Indian child” in the ICWA could exclude individuals who are racially classified
as Indians but who are not politically eligible for membership in a tribe. 281 In
further considering this point, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that the law ties
eligibility at least in part, on whether the child is eligible for membership in a
federally recognized tribe, and therefore, conditioning a child’s eligibility for
membership on whether a biological parent is a member of the tribe is not a
proxy for race, but rather for the not-yet formalized tribal affiliation. 282
In Zinke, the district court determined that the ICWA did not survive strict
scrutiny review because the federal defendants did not offer the court a
compelling government interest that the ICWA’s purported racial classifications
served. 283 In evaluating whether the government met its burden of proof with
regard to the narrow tailoring requirement, the court determined that “fulfilling
Congress’s unique obligation toward the Indians,” and “maintain[ing] the Indian
child’s relationship with the tribe” did not meet the necessarily required and
stronger government interest. 284 In contrast, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit found
that
[g]iven Congress’s explicit findings and stated objectives in enacting the ICWA
. . . the special treatment the ICWA affords Indian children [wa]s rationally tied
to Congress’s fulfillment of its unique obligation toward Indian nations and its

279. See Metteer, infra note 280, at 56.
280. See Christine M. Metteer, A Law Unto Itself: The Indian Child Welfare Act as Inapplicable
and Inappropriate to the Transracial/Race-Matching Adoption Controversy, 38 BRANDEIS L. J. 47,
54 (1999–2000).
281. See id. at 56 (pointing out that “because the race-matching preferences of the ICWA apply
only to members or children of members of federally recognized tribes, rather than to all who might
be racially classified as ‘Indian,’ these preferences are also ‘political rather than racial in nature’”);
but see Watts, supra note 15, at 229 (arguing that for Indian parents no longer affiliated with a tribe,
application of the ICWA’s placement preferences may be unconstitutionally discriminatory).
However, Watts points out that because the ICWA provides for judicial discretion if “good cause”
exists, the proper challenge would be one of the court’s discretion, not the validity of the ICWA.
Id.
282. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 428.
283. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 534 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
284. Id. at 534, 536. But see Watts, supra note 15, at 229 (noting that “Congress could have
reasonably believed that tribal survival interests would be protected by requiring Indian parents to
submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts under certain circumstances and by limiting
their parental autonomy in placement preference,” and thus, “[b]y protecting these interests,
Congress could have believed it was fulfilling its ‘unique obligation toward Indians.’”).
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stated purpose of protecting the best interests of Indian children and promoting
the stability and security of Indian tribes. 285

While the Fifth Circuit only considered whether there was a rational link
between the ICWA and the governmental interest in the Indian tribes and the
best interests of Indian children, the analysis below finds that the ICWA’s
classifications also meet strict scrutiny review.
Even assuming the interests of Congress in the enactment of the ICWA were
compelling, the district court determined that the ICWA was over-inclusive, and
therefore not narrowly tailored, because it establishes standards that are
unrelated to specific tribes’ interests and applies those standards to potential
Indian children. 286 The district court reasoned that by “[a]pplying the preference
to any Indian, regardless of tribe, [the statute was] not narrowly tailored to
maintaining the Indian child’s relationship with his tribe.” 287 Further, the district
court noted that the ICWA applies to many children who will never become
members of any Indian tribe, and “the first preference is to place the child with
family members who may not be tribal members at all”—thus, “[t]hese
provisions burden more children than necessary to accomplish the goal of
ensuring children remain with their tribes.” 288
By finding that the ICWA was not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
government interest, the district court in Zinke failed to consider the
longstanding history of legislation that singles out Indians for particular and
special treatment, including statutes which grant tax immunity, jurisdiction over
reservation affairs, federal welfare benefits, and other treatment. 289 The
reasoning used by the Supreme Court in Mancari drew on a historical and legal
context in which Congress acknowledged the assumption of a special “guardianward” status with respect to Indian tribes, while also endeavoring to “turn[ ] over
to the Indians a greater control of their own destinies.” 290 By failing to consider
the history of legislation granting special status to Indians, the district court
glossed over the important rationale behind the ICWA which demonstrates
several compelling interests, including increasing tribal control over their
governance, protecting the future growth and stability of the tribe in their
children, and preventing the traumatic and biased removal of Indian children

285. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d at 430.
286. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 535.
287. Id. (emphasis in original).
288. Id. at 535–36.
289. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554–55. See also Gallagher, supra note 11, at 82 (noting
that an important context to the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act is the fact that Indians
are the only “foreign” people singled out in the Constitution, and they have always had a special
relationship with the American government).
290. 417 U.S. at 551, 553.
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from their tribes and families. 291 The substantive, jurisdictional, and procedural
requirements of the ICWA are compelled by the grim history of removing Indian
children from their tribes and families, and are designed to specifically protect
against the occurrence of such practices. 292 For instance, the provisions of the
ICWA requiring a state court to transfer child custody proceedings to a tribal
court absent good cause are specifically designed to protect the rights of the
“Indian child as an Indian,” as well as the rights of the Indian parents or
custodians, and their tribe. 293 Thus, the district court failed to recognize the
compelling government interests found in decades of jurisprudence and
supported by the ICWA.
In deciding that the ICWA is not narrowly tailored enough to justify the
classifications with it, the district court failed to acknowledge an important
reality for children protected by the ICWA: to be Indian is not to have a 100
percent blood quantum of any single tribe, but rather, to be Indian is to be
connected to language, religion, ancestry, storytelling, meaningful relationships
with close family members, and possibly a reservation or tribal community. 294
It is often children who have blended or multiple cultural identities that trigger
the most contentious battles under the ICWA, and a child’s multiple identities
often influence courts’ reasoning with respect to child custody proceedings. 295
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit acknowledges the complex nature of tribal identity
in its determination that the classifications within the ICWA are political and not
racial, and points out that the ICWA’s definition of “Indian child” is not based
solely on tribal ancestry or race itself. 296 For instance, the appellate court
acknowledges that some tribal membership laws extend eligibility to children
291. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386 at 2. See also Metteer, supra note 280, at 59–60 (recognizing “the
compelling governmental interests in preserving the very existence and integrity of Indian tribes
by preventing the removal of their children,” and pointing out that per the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978), “[a]fter such findings have
been made, the governmental interest in preferring members of the injured groups at the expense
of others is substantial, since the legal rights of the victims must be vindicated”).
292. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386 at 19. By acknowledging the harm caused by boarding schools,
the legislative history of the ICWA codifies a requirement for children to remain at home while
they attend school. Id. at 9, 27. Additionally, where state law affords a higher degree of protection
for an Indian custodian, such a standard will be applied by the state court in lieu of the protection
afforded by the ICWA. Id. at 25. Acknowledging the harm originating from social work practices,
Congress notes that a white, middle class standard of parenting and family structure will not be
applied to remove children from their homes. Id. at 11, 20.
293. Id. at 3, 23.
294. See ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 46–55. See also Fred Lomayesva, Indian Identity-Post
Indian Reflections, 35 TULSA L. J. 63, 67-68 (1999) (discussing the limits of a framework of Indian
identity which includes blood quantum and pointing out that any blood quantum is arbitrary and
will disenfranchise members of an Indian community and fail to recognize tribal adoption practices
which may include cross-racial adoptions).
295. See ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 7.
296. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 429 (2019).
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without Indian blood, such as the descendants of former slaves of tribes, who
became members after they were freed, or the descendants of adopted white
persons. 297 Thus, the appellate court pointed out that a child may fall under the
ICWA’s membership standard because his or her biological parent became a
member of the tribe, despite not being racially Indian. 298 In the face of tensions
about blood quantum and tribal membership, the ICWA respects the tribe’s
decision on membership as conclusive and protects Indian children regardless
of their blood quantum. 299 Further, the ICWA recognizes that tribes vary
dramatically in defining and keeping track of membership, but all tribes are
concerned with preserving their future in their children. 300
Children with mixed identities illustrate the reality that the ICWA is as
narrowly tailored as it can be, while still being broad enough to successfully
protect the future interest of the tribe. 301 That is to say, just because a child’s
blood quantum is less than 100 percent Indian does not mean the tribe has no
interest in the child, nor in protecting their future and culture in that child’s
life. 302 Thus, in finding that the ICWA is not narrowly tailored because it is overinclusive, the district court in Zinke failed to recognize the full purpose and
importance of the ICWA in the current age. However, the Fifth Circuit brought
the purpose and realities of the ICWA and the children it protects to the forefront
of its analysis and considered the nuance of identity when considering the
constitutionality of the law. 303 Ultimately, the structures of the ICWA and the
outcomes it fosters for children, families, and tribes, as well as the substantive

297. Id. at 428.
298. Id.
299. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012) (finding that an Indian child for the purposes of the ICWA
is “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe
or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe”). See also GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT,
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 10 (2016) (determining that the “ICWA does not apply simply based
on a child or parent’s Indian ancestry,” but rather that “there must be a political relationship to the
Tribe”).
300. See ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 38. Some tribes use blood quantum requirements, others
define membership as including “[all] children born to resident members;” others use either a
matrilineal or patrilineal framework for determining membership. Id. at 38–39. To further
complicate the issue of enrollment, “DNA testing for ‘Native American markers’ has been debated
among tribes as a method of determining biological ancestry,” and “one study reported that there
are over thirty-three different definitions of ‘Indian’ in federal law.” See id. at 39, 38 n.105.
301. See Metteer, supra note 280, at 58–59 (finding that the ICWA is narrowly tailored to apply
only to Indian children who are members or eligible to become members of a federally-recognized
tribe, and the governmental interest is compelling because it the ICWA is a measure that furthers
the government’s interest in preserving the very existence and integrity of the Indian tribes by
preventing the removal of their children).
302. See ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 38, 245–46.
303. See generally Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (2019).
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and procedural requirements within the law, are strong enough to withstand even
the highest standard of review. 304
5.

The Fifth Amendment Due Process Claim

In Zinke, the individual plaintiffs claimed that Sections 1910(a) and (b) of
the ICWA, as well as the 2016 Final Rule, violated the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause because the ICWA’s racial preferences “disrupt . . . intimate
familial relationships based solely on the arbitrary fact of tribal membership”
and families have a fundamental right “to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children.” 305 The district court reasoned that while
the Supreme Court has recognized both custody and the right to keep the family
together as fundamental rights, 306 the Court has never applied those rights to
foster families, nor to a situation involving prospective adoptive parents whose
adoption is open to collateral attack. 307 Thus, the district court determined there
was no violation of the Due Process protections of the Fifth Amendment with
respect to the individual plaintiffs. 308 This claim was not raised on appeal by the
plaintiffs, and the Fifth Circuit did not address it.
X. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE ICWA: RECOGNIZING THE TENSION IN
INTERESTS
Despite its criticism and a handful of challenges to its constitutionality, the
ICWA has achieved considerable success since 1978, including an increase in
respect for tribal authority, an expansion in tribal family preservation programs,
and a reduction in the rate of removal of Indian children from their homes. 309
The following policy recommendations suggest modifications of the Indian
Child Welfare Act and the 2016 Final Rule in light of the success of the ICWA
to date. These proposals are designed to address the concerns raised by the
Brackeens and other adoptive parents in “hard cases,” as well as balance the
wishes of Indian parents and respect the role of the tribe and tribal courts in child
304. See Metteer, supra note 280, at 58 (noting, “even under the strict scrutiny test demanded
in cases involving ‘racial classifications [which might be] constitutionally suspect,’ the ICWA
passes constitutional muster” because the ICWA is narrowly tailored to further the compelling
governmental interest of applying the law to only the federally-recognized tribes with whom the
United States government has a political connection as a semi-sovereign nation).
305. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 546 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
306. Id.; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (holding “that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 720 (1997) (acknowledging the right of parents “to direct the education and upbringing of
one’s children” as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
307. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 546.
308. Id.
309. ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 193. But see Metteer, supra note 280, at 84 (finding that “the
ICWA does not work well and never has”).
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custody proceedings. As with all child custody proceedings, there are many
parties and many interests—the right balance acknowledges tension where
interests are truly at odds and gives voice to parents, tribes, and the children
themselves. In fact, a construction of the ICWA that permits a multiplicity of
voices to be heard at the placement stage of Indian child custody proceedings in
state court will better serve the interests of children. 310
Proposal 1: Trust the Tribes and Tribal Courts to make determinations
about the child’s best interests in custody proceedings. A fundamental theme in
state court jurisprudence is the assumption that a child who has bonded to a
primary caregiver within a stable placement will suffer harm if the child’s
custodial arrangement is disrupted, and thus, a body of judge-made and statutory
law increasingly recognizes the significance of continuity of care in children’s
lives. 311 Where the ICWA applies to an Indian child who has been in a stable
placement for a significant period of time, state courts often search for a basis to
avoid the ICWA’s substantive and jurisdictional provisions, in an effort to
preserve the child’s immediate sense of home and belonging. 312 However, this
avoidance of the ICWA is unnecessary and is predicated on a belief that the
tribe’s interests and the child’s interests are fundamentally incompatible and
cannot be reconciled. Despite the tribal court’s ultimate decision to permit the
Indian children to remain with their non-Indian adoptive parents, the exercise of
collective tribal power against an individual Indian parent, exemplified in cases
such as Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, has fueled opposition
to the ICWA. 313 Some scholars question the view that tribal power trumps
parental choice in voluntary adoptions of children domiciled on a reservation
and as such, much of the literature bears an anti-tribal tone, portraying the ICWA
as a tool of power-hungry Indian tribes who are insensitive to the true welfare
of their children. 314

310. Atwood, supra note 26, at 596.
311. Atwood, supra note 26, at 593. Tribes themselves have also recognized the importance of
stability, continuity, and permanency in a child’s life and some tribes have drafted creative code
provisions to define children’s interests within a tribal perspective. See ATWOOD, supra note 4, at
273–74. Such terms include “a child’s need for love, nurturing, protection, and stability,” “a child’s
need for family,” “a child’s need for identity,” and others. Id.
312. ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 272. See also supra notes 71–75 (discussing the existing Indian
family doctrine). See also Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture,
Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 648 (1994) (discussing the
deep distrust that state courts feel for tribal courts and the ways this distrust negatively impacts
their examinations of good cause, including the mislabeling of difference as incompetence).
Further, Carriere points out that “[s]tate courts have repeatedly signalled [sic] their belief that
transfer to tribal courts will lead to placements contrary to the Native American children’s welfare.”
Id.
313. Atwood, supra note 26, at 591.
314. Id.
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Instead of taking the posture of skepticism toward tribal courts, state courts
should trust the tribe and tribal courts to determine the best interests of an Indian
child in custody proceedings. Tribal courts have demonstrated a commitment to
protecting the child’s sense of family, as well as the child’s cultural and tribal
identity, even when this balance resulted in the placement of the child with a
non-Indian family. 315 Notably, the tribal court reached the conclusion in
Holyfield that the best interest of the twins was to remain with their adoptive
family. 316 Similarly, in the case of the Brackeens and the Librettis, the children’s
tribes have demonstrated their recognition of the importance of the children
remaining with their adoptive family where removal would be disruptive.
Proposal 2: Adjust the window for collateral attack of the adoption of an
Indian child to be the same as state adoption proceedings (typically one year),
while simultaneously strengthening the notice requirement for tribes. This
proposal is supported by the notion that the ICWA is most effective when tribes
intervene early, and children are best served when their early years are not
disrupted by the uncertainty of adoption proceedings and long periods of
collateral attack. 317 Additionally, the tribe’s interests and the Indian parents’
interests are aligned in the early stages of a custody proceeding—both the
parents and the tribe want the Indian child to be placed in a loving, nurturing
home. Shortening the period for collateral attack by the Indian parent and the
tribe serves the purpose of lessening the period of uncertainty after adoption and
serves the interests of the adoptive family as well as the Indian child. 318
Additionally, the notice requirement is essential to the tribe’s right to assert
jurisdiction or to intervene in placement proceedings. 319 While the ICWA
provides “rigorous requirements” for notice, tribes are often not given timely
notice and learn about the child’s placement after the child has lived with the
prospective adoptive family for a long time. 320 In this situation, there would be
a heavy emotional toll on the parties if the child were removed. 321 Therefore,
shortening the period of collateral attack to reduce uncertainty for children and
315. DUTHU, supra note 11, at 153. See O’Connor, supra note 239, at 3 (noting that tribal courts
often act more quickly and more informally than their federal and state counterpart, and incorporate
tribal customs and beliefs into the factors considered to reach a decision, the procedures used, and
the punishment or resolution arrived at). “Tribal court judges frequently are tribal members who
seek to infuse cultural values into the process.” Id. See also ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 274.
316. DUTHU, supra note 11, at 153.
317. ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 242.
318. See ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 243 (calling proposed amendments to the ICWA in 2001
and 2003 “sensible improvements in the Act by facilitating the participation of birth parents and
tribes while also placing outside limits on belated challenges”). Imposing strict and clear notice
requirements would reduce the number of “‘hard cases’ that result from delay” by a participant,
where the delay “often has compelling significance in the world of a child.” Id.
319. Metteer, supra note 280, at 75.
320. Id. at 75.
321. Id.
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adoptive families comes at a cost to tribes unless the notice requirement is
strictly adhered to and even strengthened. While state courts remain split over
whether strict compliance or substantial compliance with the notice
requirements in the ICWA is required, the 2016 Final Rule should be modified
to mandate strict compliance with each of the written notice requirements
already set out in the ICWA, thereby strengthening the notice requirement to
protect tribal sovereignty and a right to intervene in child custody
proceedings. 322 Strict compliance with notice requirements models trust for the
tribe.
Proposal 3: Expand the proceedings to which the ICWA does not apply to
include the adoption of an Indian child by any member of either biological
parent’s immediate family, such as the child’s grandparents, aunts, and uncles.
This proposal is tailored to address the “hard cases” where one biological parent
is an Indian and one is a non-Indian, and members of the extended family of the
non-Indian parent are seeking to adopt the child. Under the ICWA, the child’s
adoption proceedings could be transferred to a tribal court, creating uncertainty
for the non-Indian family members seeking to adopt the child. The relevance of
this policy proposal is underlined by the fact that children with blended or
multiple cultural identities trigger the most contentious battles under the ICWA,
and it is children with mixed identities who seem to challenge the meaning of
“Indian-ness” under the law. 323 While some critics of the ICWA’s broad
applicability advocate for a narrower definition of “Indian child,” a simple, less
drastic expansion of those eligible to adopt children without the application of
the ICWA may solve the “hard cases” brought before many state courts without
relinquishing protection for Indian children not residing on reservations. 324
In the alternative, Congress may also reconsider the repeated urging of tribal
leaders to amend the ICWA to include a provision permitting open adoptions,
even where such adoptions are otherwise prohibited by state law. 325 This

322. See id. at 75–76. See also ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 242–43 (pointing out that the 2001
and 2003 proposed amendments to the ICWA would have required effective notice to tribes of
voluntary placements and would have expressly given tribes a right to intervene, while also setting
out express time limits and requirements for notice). These proposed amendments failed to pass.
Id. at 242.
323. See ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 7 (describing the case of In re the Matter of Lupe Moriah
Alegria, DC 201 (Northern Cheyenne Tribal Ct.)).
324. See id., at 244–45 (explaining potential amendments which would have revised the
definition of “Indian child” under the ICWA to either eliminate the requirement of a biological
parent who is an Indian, include children who are not eligible for membership with the tribe but
who reside on the reservation nonetheless, and other possible revisions of the definition of “Indian
child”).
325. Id. at 276. See also Hawkins-Leon, The Indian Child Welfare Act and the African
American Tribe: Facing the Adoption Crisis, 36 BRANDEIS L. J. 201, 216–17 (1997-98) (advocating
for a “child-centered” approach to adoption, which blends the biological family and the adoptive
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potential amendment, while controversial, would create the possibility that the
child may keep ties with his or her culture even if adopted by a non-Indian
family, or a member of his or her extended, non-Indian family. 326 Tribes offer
their own cultural view of adoption by creating “alternative permanency
options,” such as a permanent guardianship, which creates a parent-child
relationship with someone other than the child’s birth parents but does not
legally terminate the birth parent’s parental rights. 327 Such an option may create
the sense of permanency and belonging a child deserves, while also respecting
the authority and sovereignty of the tribe. 328 No matter what, it is imperative for
the success of the ICWA and the future of tribal communities that state courts
trust tribal courts to make healthy, educated, and fair decisions about the custody
of their children—where state courts seek to subvert the ICWA by avoiding the
transfer of cases to tribal court using the existing Indian family doctrine, the
future of Indian tribes and families is in jeopardy.
Proposal 4: Amend the ICWA to guarantee consideration of biological
parents’ preferences in the context of voluntary adoption. An example of such
an amendment would adjust the ICWA to shift the burden to the contesting party
to show that the parents’ preferences for the adoption of their child are not in the
child’s best interest. Such an amendment would bring the ICWA more in line
with the fundamental parental rights acknowledged in Troxel while still
honoring the context and authority of tribal courts over custody proceedings.
Such an amendment to the ICWA would also recognize the consensual and
political nature of membership in a tribal community and appropriately value
the parents’ choice to raise their child outside of such a community. Further, the
tribal court would be free to consider the tribe’s interests as a counterbalance to
the parents’ preferences, but under this proposal, the tribal court must at least
consider the biological parents’ wishes. This consideration would jointly honor
the tribe’s authority and the individual citizenship of its members. In order to
ensure that biological parents’ preferences are not dispositive as to the adoption
of the child and that the interests of the tribe are properly considered, state courts
should also model the cooperative dispute resolution processes used in tribal
family into an extended family unit, as opposed to a nuclear family model, which recognizes a clear
delineation between the two family units).
326. See ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 244 n.167 (quoting Indian Child Welfare Joint Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. Of Indian Affairs and House Resources Comm. (1997) (testimony of
Deborah Doxtator)).
327. Id. at 278 (describing the White Earth Band of Ojibwe’s Customary Adoption Code, which
affirms the tribe’s commitment to the preservation of a child’s identity as a tribal member and
member of an extended family and clan, while also providing a sense of permanency and
belonging). Under the Customary Adoption Code, a customary adoption is defined broadly to mean
“a traditional tribal practice recognized by the community and tribe which gives the child a
permanent parent-child relationship with someone other than the child’s birth parents,” while
suspending, but not permanently terminating, the biological parents’ rights. Id.
328. Id. at 278–79. See also Watts, supra note 15, at 254.
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courts, as well as consider tribal values, culture, and customs in child-rearing. 329
“State courts that recognize the Indian child’s multiple identities, emotional ties,
and potential allegiances in trying to determine the best placement” promote an
individualized application of the ICWA without avoiding the law altogether. 330
CONCLUSION
The ICWA is fraught with tension. Adoptive parents, biological parents,
tribes, state governments, tribal courts, and the United States government all
have an interest in protecting Indian children. 331 The child herself has interests,
too. The ICWA acknowledges the areas where those interests overlap—tribes
have an interest in preserving their future, and this future is incarnate in their
children today. Children and parents—biological and adoptive—have an interest
in the early years of a child’s life not being disrupted by lengthy custody
proceedings and complicated appeals. However, the tribe is protected with a
jurisdictional presumption against the state, and adoptive parents find
themselves in potentially unfavorable forums when they seek to adopt Indian
children.
History has demonstrated a compelling state interest in protecting the
original purpose of the ICWA: Indian children. While the ICWA is
controversial, the plenary power of Congress to regulate Indian affairs is broad,
and the ICWA sits squarely within it. Even when faced with the difficult cases
such as Baby O, A.L.M., and Child P, courts are equipped with precedent that
suggests that the interests of the tribe, the biological parents, and the adoptive
parents can be resolved in a way that serves the best interests of the child. In
Zinke, the district court lost track of the original purpose of the ICWA by
severing the best interests of the child from the future of the tribe. On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit acted to protect Indian children and their tribes by preserving
the constitutionality of the ICWA. However, the future of Indian children and

329. See O’Connor, supra note 239, at 3. Tribal Court systems are marked by their focus on a
cooperative dispute resolution process, which is particularly useful where family issues are
involved. Id.
330. ATWOOD, supra note 4, at 249. See also Hawkins-Leon, supra note 325, at 217 (suggesting
that when the “child-centered” approach to adoption is applied, and the children’s and parents’
rights conflict, the system has traditionally protected the child, thus giving support to the theory
that the extended family model of adoption, rather than simply viewing the adoption in the context
of a nuclear family, is appropriate for adoption).
331. See Hawkins-Leon, supra note 325, at 201 (pointing out at least five competing interests
in the adoption process, including the child, the biological parents, the adoptive parents, the agency
or attorney arranging the adoption, and the state).
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their tribes is about more than protection and preservation of a statutory scheme
or a child’s best interests. It is about remembering.
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